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Abstract

Human trafficking poses a threat to national security and undermines global order.
Trafficking exploits sovereign borders and undermines state legitimacy by highlighting
failures of governance. This thesis seeks to understand policy responses to human trafficking,
which are essential to providing resilient national security while upholding human rights.
I conducted a mixed methods analysis to examine three levels of government
response to trafficking: domestic, regional/international, and foreign domestic measures. I
examined how the United States Senate develops anti-trafficking legislation, how human
rights regimes are developing within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN),
and how specific Southeast Asian nations have responded to the Department of State's
annual Trafficking in Persons (TIP) Report.
I examined the 1121h and I 13th Congresses and find that both conservative and liberal
Senators support trafficking legislation, but with discernable differences in emphasis. I
applied Oran Young's framework for studying international regimes to examine ASEAN
responses to human rights issues. I find surprisingly little hegemonic influence from either
Indonesia or the United States, which correlates to China's concurrent hegemony in the
South China Sea. I find that Trafficking in Persons TIP Tier ratings correlate with corruption,
as well as the robustness of state human rights regimes, with several surprising caveats.
Finally, findings indicate that democratic governance and growth in defense spending as a
percentage of GDP are predictors of TIP Tier ratings.

Acknowledgements

This project would not have been possible without the support of many people. Many
thanks to my advisor, Professor Ryan C. Hendrickson, for challenging me to be rigorous and
concise in my research, but also for your wisdom. Thank you to my committee members,
Professors Andrew D. McNitt and Melinda A. Mueller, for your insight and expertise. I'm
astounded at how much I learned from you in such a short time.
I am grateful to Dr. Margaret Messer for facilitating this project, regardless of what
time zone I was in or how overwhelmed my calendar has been with my military service. I
would not have made it to EIU, much less completed this thesis, but for your diligence,
encouragement, and love. Thank you.
Thank you, John, Caleb, Joshua, and Elijah, for your fierce love. You are my beloved
sons. Every moment I am away, I strive to make this world a better place for you. And yes,
boys, I did finally finish my "five pages." Thanks for encouraging me!
Jenny, thank you for your love, your wisdom, and your courage. You have always
done more than your share: during my deployments, our frequent globe-trotting moves, and
my ridiculous schedule. You are amazing. I love you deeply, and I persevered through this
project to eliminate another obstacle in our journey together. I look forward to future
adventures together, side by side with you.
Finally, I am nothing without Jesus. He has used this thesis as one more tool to shape
my character; it has been painful, but fruitful. Any good I contribute comes from him; every
failure is because I've taken my eyes off him. May his truth and justice prevail, in love.

11

Table of Contents

Acknowledgments ............................................................................ ii
Table of Contents ............................................................................ iii
List of Figures ................................................................................ .iv
List of Tables .............................................................................. .... v
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................... 2
CHAPTER 1: LITERATURE REVIEW .................................................. 6
CHAPTER 2: Congressional Responses to Human Trafficking ....................... 21
CHAPTER 3: The ASEAN Human Rights Declaration and Human Trafficking: Rhetoric or
Real Protection? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

42

CHAPTER 4: Southeast Asia and Human Trafficking: Comparing State Responses to the
Trafficking in Persons Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION ............................................................. 100
REFERENCES ............................................................................... 106

lll

List of Figures

Figure 3.1

Three Developmental Sequences for International Regimes ......... 47

Figure 4.1

Defense Spending as a Percentage of GDP for Indonesia, Thailand, and

Philippines, 2001-2012 ............................................................ 84
Figure 4.2

Defense Spending as a Percentage of GDP for Indonesia, Thailand,

Philippines, Malaysia, and Singapore, 2001-2012 .............................. 85
Figure 4.3

Defense Spending as a Percentage of GDP for Brunei, Cambodia, Laos,

Myanmar, and Vietnam, 2001-2012 ............................................. 85
Figure 4.4

TIP Tier Ratings: Indonesia, Thailand, and Philippines 2001-2013 ... 86

Figure 4.5

Corruption Perceptions Index, Southeast Asia, 2001-2013 .......... 87

Figure 4.6

Corruption Perceptions Index, Indonesia, Thailand, and Philippines 2001-

2013 ··················································································· 87

IV

List of Tables

Table 2.1

Selected Senators Active on Human Trafficking Legislation, 112th and 113th

Congresses, and their ideological ratings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Table 2.2

Recent Human Trafficking and National Security Bills Sponsored by Senator

Comyn (R-TX) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Table 2.3

23

26

Recent Human Trafficking and National Security Bills Sponsored by Senator

Boxer (D-CA) ...................................................................... 28
Table 2.4

Sampling ofNational Security Bills, 113th Congress .................. 38

Table 2.5

Selected Senators active on National Security and Human Trafficking

Legislation, 1121h and 113th Congresses, and their ideological scores ...... 40
Table 3 .1

ASEAN Human Rights Legislation (and other relevant documents) 53

Table 3.2

National Human Rights Institutions in ASEAN states ............... 56

Table 4.1

Percentage of International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law

Conventions Ratified, ASEAN states ............................................. 78
Table 4.2

Test #1: Compare Ratification Rate of Human Rights Conventions between 5

Nominally Democratic, 5 Non-democratic states in Southeast Asia.......... 79
Table 4.3

Test #2: Compare Ratification Rate of Human Rights Conventions between

Nominally Democratic and Non-democratic ASEAN states; eliminates the outliers
from test # 1, Cambodia and Singapore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Table 4.4

79

Test #3: Compare Ratification Rate of Human Rights Conventions between

Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam (CLMV) vs non-CLMV states in Southeast
Asia ................................................................................... 80
Table 4.5

Test #4: Compare Ratification Rates of Human Rights Conventions between

Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam (CLMV) vs non-CLMV states in Southeast
Asia, eliminate outliers (Cambodia/Singapore) from test #3 .................. 80
Table 4.6

Test #5: Compare Ratification Rate of Human Rights Conventions between

Wealthiest vs Poorest ASEAN states, 2012 IMF GDP estimates ............ 81
Table 4. 7

Political Rights Strongly Predict TIP Tier Rating ..................... 83

v

Human Trafficking and National Security: Policy Responses

Our fight against human trafficking is one of the great human rights causes of
our time, and the United States will continue to lead it ... it ought to concern
every person, because it's a debasement of our common humanity. It ought to
concern every community, because it tears at the social fabric. It ought to
concern every business, because it distorts markets. I'm talking about the
injustice, the outrage, of human trafficking, which must be called by its true
name- modern slavery.
~ President Barack Obama, 25 September 2012

Transnational organized crime (TOC) is an abiding threat to US economic and
national security interests ... the growing reach of TOC networks is pushing
them to form strategic alliances with state leaders and foreign intelligence
service personnel ... human smuggling and trafficking are TOC activities that
are increasing due to globalization ... TOC are moving into human trafficking
because it is a lower risk, higher profit operation... Terrorists and insurgents
will increasingly turn to crime and criminal networks for funding and
logistics ... Criminal connections and activities of both Hizballah and AQIM
illustrate this trend.
~James

Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, 31 January 2012

Introduction

Human trafficking has become a global issue that strikes at the core of universal
human rights, and stands diametrically opposed to American values of liberty and justice.
Trafficking is also a threat to U.S. national security. Broad condemnation of trafficking is
evident throughout government, from the United States president and Congress to nearly
every national and international leader throughout the world, dating back to the 1990s and
resulting in the groundbreaking passage of the Victims of Trafficking and Violence
Protection Act of 2000 (TVPA-2000). 1 And yet we still have a limited understanding of the
problem. Statistics are poorly supported, methods of collecting data are widely inconsistent,
and measures of success in countering trafficking are mixed at best (DeStefano 2008; TIP
2013; Chouvy 2013). Many researchers point out that there are more slaves today than at
any time in history, with recent estimates between 20 and 31 million enslaved human beings
globally (Free The Slaves 2013).
Human trafficking is one of the top three most profitable illicit global activities, with
estimated profits rivaling criminal trade in guns and drugs. Trafficking profits have been
estimated at US $31.6 billion per year (Besler 2005). One report from the International
Organization for Migration (IOM) (Wheaton, Schauer, and Galli 2010) anticipates that
trafficking could surpass drugs and guns as the most profitable criminal activity within the
next decade. Chouvy (2013) expands on this rapidly growing prominence and cites multiple
sources indicating human trafficking may soon become the most profitable, surpassing the
illegal drug and gun economies. This trade in humans arguably becomes more attractive to
terrorists (Giraldo and Trinkunas, 2007), considering the risk versus reward calculation. The
1 Public Law No. 106-386, passed 28 October 2000, was the first substantive U.S. legislation addressing human
trafficking. Chapter two will provide further discussion of United States federal laws on the subject of human
trafficking.
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United States Intelligence Community (IC) identifies transnational organized crime (TOC) as
an emerging threat to national security (Clapper, 2012). The report directly links trafficking
with TOC, anticipating use of existing trafficking networks to facilitate terrorist attempts to
conduct attacks on the United States. President Obama's 2010 National Security Strategy
declares, "The American people face no greater or more urgent danger than a terrorist attack
with a nuclear weapon (p. 23)." Herein lays the nexus between trafficking and national
security; the threat posed by human trafficking networks, transnational criminal
organizations, and terrorist plots to conduct dramatic attacks against the United States, her
allies or interests, especially with weapons of mass destruction.
Human trafficking is a global problem that spares no country. The U.S. State
Department (DoS) began including the United States in their annual Trafficking in Persons
(TIP) report in 2010, acknowledging that it is a "source, transit, and destination country for
men, women, and children." Statistics have varied widely, but a Congressional Research
Service (CRS) report stated, "as many as 17,500 people are believed to be trafficked to the
United States each year (Wyler and Siskin 2010, 18)." Luis CdeBaca, Ambassador at Large
...

and director of the U.S. State Department's Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in
Persons said, " ... over the last decade, cumulatively, the amount of money that the United
States has spent on this [human trafficking] fight is about equal to a little less than a month of
what we spend on the drug war (U.S. Congress 2011, 11)." These reports highlight
vulnerabilities to national security through this convergence of human rights, economic
incentives, and incongruities within security mechanisms. While senior government officials
clearly identify the threat to national security posed by transnational organized criminal
organizations and human trafficking networks, CdeBaca highlights the lack of attention and
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funding human trafficking receives. This disparity between threat and response demands
more research and government resources to counter human trafficking, from a national
security perspective.
The vast majority of literature on human trafficking focuses on the human rights,
economic, and social justice aspects of the issue (Bales and Soodalter 2009; DeStefano 2008;
Rizer and Glaser 2011; Ban Ki-moon 2012). Recently, more analysis and some limited
academic research identifies transnational criminal organizations as a rising factor in
trafficking. Shelley (2010) extensively documents the role of TOC, to include significant
regional variations in trafficking, which demands a varied and flexible approach to
countering human trafficking. She documents examples of clear security threats, such as the
use of these networks to smuggle essential persons or components necessary to conduct
strategic terror attacks within the United States. The gravest concern is of a nuclear terror
attack (Levi 2007; Obama 201 O; Clapper 2012).
Miani (2011), Chouvy (2013), and Feingold (2013) survey trafficking in Southeast
Asia, identifying the complexity of geographic, economic, ethnic, religious, and political
issues which complicate enforcement and regional security. These studies also point to the
lack of scholarship addressing trafficking, and the challenges of gathering reliable data. I
argue that the threat of trafficking has not received sufficient attention or resources to address
the security threat posed by these existing "rat lines."2 In an effort to analyze how different

The concept of"rat lines" is important to understand, in order to fully conceptualize my thesis of human
trafficking as a national security threat. The expression "rat line" refers to clandestine routes of travel; historic
examples include the "underground railroad" of Harriet Tubman and networks that smuggled Jews and downed
airmen from behind Nazi lines during World War Two. The term is used worldwide; in Indonesia and Malaysia,
security forces, politicians, and even the media refer to "jalan tikus" and "lorong tikus;" literally, rat
road/alley/corridor, or "rat lines," where smugglers bypass official border controls. The term dates back to early
maritime language, where a "ratline" was a rope, usually knotted, and used by sailors for climbing. The sailors
found that rats used the ropes even more adeptly, and confounded attempts to eradicate the rat population
aboard their vessels.
2
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government entities are responding to this growing challenge, for this thesis I will use a
model based upon Michael Levi's study, On Nuclear Terrorism (2007), who maintains that
security challenges are best mitigated by incrementally improving multiple levels of security.
In doing so, this thesis examines the American domestic response, an international
assessment, and a study of foreign states' efforts to combat trafficking.
In the following chapters I will conduct a mixed methods analysis of available data to
examine these three levels of governmental response to this critical security threat. More
specifically, in chapter two I will focus on United States policy, with emphasis on Congress.
Though much research exists on the Congressional role in shaping American foreign policy
and its interest in human rights concerns (Avery and Forsythe 1979; McCormick and
Mitchell 2007; Forsythe 2012), little research has focused on Congress's interest in human
trafficking, beyond the human rights focus. Chapter three will study the role of the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), in their efforts to combat human
trafficking. Analysts have given much attention to the role of regional and international
organizations (IO) in human rights (Allred 2006; Destefano 2009; Ban Ki-moon 2012),
though similar to chapter two, few analysts have studied IO efforts to counter human
trafficking from a security perspective. I will analyze ASEAN as a regional institution by
adapting Young's (1982) framework for studying regime dynamics. In this chapter I will
focus primarily on the 2011-2012 period that culminated in the passage of the ASEAN
Human Rights Declaration (AHRD). The AHRD is the strongest regional human rights
mechanism in Southeast Asia, and yet has been widely criticized for its lack of transparency,
and caveats to commitments that many scholars assert undermine existing international
human rights laws that ASEAN member states have previously committed to. Chapter four

5

will provide comparative analysis, looking at several Asian countries in their efforts to
counter human trafficking. Specifically, this chapter examines Indonesia, the Philippines, and
Thailand. These three countries are all founding members of A SEAN; each has demonstrated
significant progress, and some regression, in combatting trafficking in the past 13 years (see
Figure 4.1 ), which provides an opportunity to assess what factors correlate with those
changes; Thailand and the Philippines are two of only seven United States treaty allies; all
three have significant economic and strategic value to U.S. interests; finally, each has charted
a unique path towards democracy, and provide opportunities to compare and contrast
different policies and political approaches to the challenges of human trafficking.
In doing so, this thesis provides a multi-tiered analysis of human trafficking and an
array of governmental entity responses to this growing security challenge.

Chapter 1: Literature Review

Human trafficking has gained attention in the United States since the 1990s, yet
remains the purview of a limited group of scholars and policy makers. In contrast, "national
security," broadly defined, is more prominent historically, especially following the terrorist
attacks on September 11, 2001. Academics and policymakers hotly dispute what threatens
national security, and how best to address these threats, but most agree that terrorism remains
a threat. To date, however, few have identified human trafficking as a national security
threat. On the contrary, most scholars and policymakers focus on the human rights aspect of
human trafficking. For purposes of this thesis, I will review literature focused on U.S.
Congressional attention and legislation relating to trafficking and human rights, and literature
addressing Southeast Asian approaches as well. Specifically, I will look at specific Southeast
Asian states, as well as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
6

The security threat posed by human trafficking has been established, yet the
correlation gains surprisingly little attention, beyond the context of immigration and border
security (Hastings 2010; Rizer and Glaser 2011; Rosental 2013). Blessed with geopolitical
advantages, the United States faces few existential threats (Friedman 201 O; Grygiel 2011;
Kaplan 2012). During the Cold War, nuclear war and the spread of communism were the
primary existential threats (Allison 1969; Lieber and Press 2006; Rizer and Glaser 2011, 76;
Kristensen and Norris 2013). Among the greatest threats to the United States in the post-Cold
War era is nuclear terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) (Levi
2007; Forstchen 2009; Obama 2010; Clapper 2012; Colluci 2013). The nuclear threat is often
overlooked or downplayed (Tannewald 1999; Waltz 2012), while other scholars articulate the
threat.
Mowatt-Larssen (2011) documents compelling evidence that core al-Qaeda continues
to pursue a nuclear capability specifically to strike America. The annual National Intelligence
Estimate, delivered to Congress on January 31, 2012 by James Clapper, the Director of
National Intelligence, directly links the threat of human smuggling and trafficking networks
being used by terrorist organizations to move WMD or the experts necessary to assemble and
employ such weapons (Clapper 2012; 2013). The opportunity for terrorist exploitation which
Mr. Clapper identifies, is the asymmetry between security efforts against the illicit
international trade in drugs and guns, versus the relatively lower risk/higher profit margins
currently associated with human trafficking.
Further illustrating why this disparity in risk exists, Siddharth Kara of the Harvard
Kennedy School noted during an interview, "the U.S. government spends 350 times more
money each year to combat drug trafficking than slavery (Kanani 2012)." He then points out
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that the U.S. government spends more than any other country in the world, demonstrating
just how few resources are applied globally toward the issues of human smuggling and
trafficking.
Baker (2007) expresses concern that these very real challenges over nuclear terror and
proliferation lead to perilous conditions for American values of due process and the rule of
law, as government seeks to prevent such perpetual threats. This same concern was noted by
President Obama in his 2010 National Security Strategy, when he stated, "The American
people face no greater or more urgent danger than a terrorist attack with a nuclear weapon
(Obama 2010)."
Rizer and Glaser (2011) analyze the connections between human trafficking and
national security. The authors identify how human smuggling and trafficking breaches our
national borders, provides elicit funding for violent extremist organizations and transnational
organized criminal organizations. This article effectively clarifies the nexus between human
rights and national security.
Terrorism and nuclear proliferation have gained a more prominent and sustained level
of attention in recent years. Colluci (2013) suggests attention to more traditional forms of
terrorism following 9/11 has inadvertently caused neglect of the nuclear terror threat, which
he proposes is the greatest existential threat facing the United States. Rizer and Glaser (2011,
88, 94) link the threat of human trafficking and the threat of terrorist attacks with WMD.
Howlett (2011) notes that nuclear and missile technology are widely diffused, creating
significant challenges for counterproliferation as well as for counterterrorism. His focus is
primarily on state proliferation, but expresses concern about the diffusion of nuclear and
missile technology, and the transnational networks that can move these materials and
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technology across borders. Allison (2004) acknowledges the threat of nuclear terrorism as a
major, but preventable threat to the United States.
Levi (2007), a physicist and energy expert, provides a comprehensive study on the
threat of nuclear terrorism targeting the United States, and finds the threat is complex and
difficult to measure. He systematically analyzes the threat and recommends a broad systems
approach to reduce the likelihood, vulnerability, and consequences of the threat, making
incremental improvements in multiple aspects of defense, arguing that such a layered
approach increases the likelihood of active threats to fail. In so doing, Levi sees a synergistic
effect by making the risk rise in multiple phases of the terrorist cycle for each individual
increase in defense. This approach addresses the nexus of human trafficking and national
security, providing a model that could be adapted by multiple institutions with divergent
purposes to produce greater security and protection ofrights. For instance, when a terrorist
group realizes the risk of compromise increases with improved intelligence and interdiction
of the pursuit for fissionable material, they may be forced to work with fewer physicists, or
work with less pure materials, which are easier to detect through technical means. By simply
raising the bar for proliferation, we can eliminate all but the most determined and
sophisticated terrorist organizations from ever actively attempting to mount a nuclear attack.
Levi further recommends a capabilities-based approach, which seeks to improve all
aspects of security, as opposed to the more traditional threat-based approach, which tends to
myopically orient defense toward a worst-case scenario, at the risk of neglecting threats
which might appear less likely or less devastating. Levi's capabilities-based approach focuses
deterrence and defense toward exploiting every conceivable vulnerability in the terrorist
operations cycle. This would include actions such as improved detection and monitoring at
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ports of entry, and improving training of all security personnel in low-tech ways, such as how
to better identify suspicious or nervous behavior at the border, and how to identify a
trafficking victim. The approach intends to improve the entire depth of defenses, because the
threat is diffuse enough that it can easily bypass any one robust aspect of security, but it is
less likely to succeed against a multi-layered defense, even if each phase of that defense is
less than fool-proof.
Each individual aspect of this approach may have weaknesses, but Levi turns
conventional wisdom on its head; the terrorist must be successful at every phase of his
operation, while the national security community needs only to succeed at one of the
terrorist's operational phases to deter, detect, disrupt or defeat his attempt. From this view,
targeting human trafficking networks through intelligence and interdiction will increase the
vulnerability of transnational criminal and terrorist organizations, thus improving national
security.
The United States Intelligence Community (IC) identifies transnational organized
crime (TOC) as an abiding threat to national security (Clapper 2012; 2013). Willetts_(201 l)
observes that transnational actors and international organizations are raising the complexity
for traditional states, and challenging their sovereignty as individual entities._This becomes
evident in counterproliferation, as no one country can avoid all threats on its own. This is
vital in terms of criminal activities conducted by transnational criminal organizations, as
Willetts is concerned about the illicit trade in arms and drugs, and the increasing ease of
trafficking in people. Ancillary activities, which support the trade in guns, drugs, and people,
such as money laundering and document forging, will exacerbate existing conflicts, as well
as directly support illicit trafficking and smuggling efforts. Baker (2007) observes that
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distinctions between domestic and global threats are becoming less defined, in the face of
transnational criminal organizations, further imperiling democratic liberties. In this manner,
some scholars view this confluence of nuclear terror, transnational organized crime, and
human trafficking as threatening the global system of state sovereignty, the Westphalian
system.
Shelley (2010, 249) provides one of the more comprehensive analyses of the impact
of human trafficking, documenting how Chinese traffickers subvert U.S. law, as well as the
links between terrorists, trafficking, and instability in conflict states. She provides in-depth
documentation of the role of transnational organized crime in human trafficking as one of the
critical destabilizing factors for global economics, health, and security (Shelley 2010, chap.

3).
Ferguson (2005, 77) considers the threat of nuclear terror against major
western targets as a direct threat to global stability, with clear implications for
national security in this highly interdependent global economy. Forsythe (2012)
acknowledges the challenges to the Westphalian system of international relations
posed by non-governmental actors, and the destabilizing impact of human trafficking
and the activities surrounding it. Scowcroft (2012) assesses that the traditional
Westphalian system is under a "quiet assault," citing nuclear weapons, corruption,
transnational threats, and differing value systems in emerging powers such as China.
In this broader context of global order, the confluence of human trafficking and
broader security concerns comes into focus.
Current literature on human trafficking largely views this phenomenon as a human
rights issue (Bales and Soodalter 2009; DeStefano 2008; Rizer and Glaser 2011; Ban Ki-
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moon 2012). Some scholars cite human trafficking as a human security threat (Cohen 2010).
Many scholars argue against associating trafficking with security, citing counterproductive
government responses such as increased immigration controls and decreased protection for
vulnerable populations. Few argue that trafficking is also a threat to national and regional
security (Brown 2010; Galeotti 2010; Miani 2011). Each of the few scholars who do identify
human trafficking as a threat to national security identifies the paucity of rigorous research
into this relationship.
Security threats periodically arise as an aspect of human rights discussions. Ironically,
most scholars explain perceptions of threats to national security as constraints on human
rights, versus as impetus for improving security mechanisms in conjunction with addressing
human rights (Brems 2003; Sharma 2005; Hebert 2012; Ronna 2012). The majority of
scholars opposed correlating human trafficking with national security, citing securitization as
resulting in anti-immigration efforts and criminalization victims.
Sharma (2005) insists that anti-trafficking campaigns are manipulated by antiimmigration efforts to establish a nefarious policy system that is a de facto global apartheid.
Sharma links this development of anti-trafficking campaigns to the historic White Slave
Trade and finds that despite human rights rhetoric, the true purpose is control of migration
(ibid 97, 105).
Migration, especially cross-border migration, is currently at an all-time high. During a
panel discussion at the Council on Foreign Relations in October 2013, William Lacy Swing,
the Director General of the United Nations International Organization for Migration, shared
the following: Worldwide, the United Nations estimates there are approximately 232 million
international migrants, and a similar number of internal migrants in China. The international
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migrants alone, if aggregated, have a population nearly the size of Indonesia. 3 These same
migrants send home remittances of an estimated $529 billion dollars a year, which is roughly
the GDP of Saudi Arabia (Meissner 2013). These migratory patterns provide great
opportunities as well as create massive vulnerabilities, especially for women and children
(Feingold 2013; Kneebone and Debeljak 2012). The remittances alone are far greater than the
entire international aid to the poor (Meissner 2013), and serve a valuable enabling role,
allowing families and communities to provide for their own needs without dependency on
government. On the other hand, the vulnerabilities for exploitation are oftentimes
overwhelming, resulting in brutal exploitation and slavery conditions in such disparate
environments as Saudi Arabia (Mietzner 2013; 41-42) and Chicago (Shelley 2010, 246-247).
Kneebone and Debeljak (2012, 266) express concern over the securitization of
migration in the Greater Mekong Region, leading to states treating vulnerable and exploited
people more as threats. They point to the lack of integrated migration policies in the region as
contributing to greater vulnerability and the proliferation of transnational crime. Kneebone
and Debeljak place emphasis on the protection of women and children as the primary
concern, as well as the greater threat to security. Scholarship from within the region lends
credence to these concerns; for example, Mohamed et al (2011) identify human trafficking as
a threat to security and sovereignty, and classifying the phenomenon as a non-traditional
threat. Non-traditional security is a central element of most modem security discussions in
Southeast Asia.
Hebert (2012) views the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPRA) and its
subsequent reauthorizations as recasting victims of trafficking as transnational actors that are
a threat to state security. Hebert is an example of a large body of scholars (Brems 2003;
3

Indonesia has the world's fourth largest population, according to CIA World Factbook
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Sharma 2005; Rieger 2007; Brysk and Choi-Fitzpatrick 2012) who see the TVPRA and antitrafficking efforts as misguided, misappropriated, or creating unintended consequences,
interpreting the Bush Administration TVPRA legislation as "efforts to patrol women's
sexuality (Hebert 2012, 101 ). " Rieger (2007) documents the role of organized crime,
corruption, and transnational criminal organizations, but criticizes Congress's failure to fully
empower women, versus criminalizing and securitizing the issue.
Though much research exists on the Congressional role in shaping American foreign
policy and its interest in human rights concerns (Avery and Forsythe 1979; McCormick and
Mitchell 2007; Forsythe 2012), little scholarly research has focused on Congress's interest in
human trafficking, beyond the human rights focus.
Avery and Forsythe (1979) conduct a quantitative analysis of how the U.S. Senate
perceive linkages between human rights and national security, and found a strong negative
correlation between the two; those members of Congress (MC) who strongly support national
security concerns are less likely to vote for human rights bills. Kerwin and Stock (2007)
conduct a survey of immigration policy in the context of national security and recommend
that Congress conduct comprehensive immigration reform to better integrate a whole of
government approach to immigration. Their recommendations include adopting a more
expansive view of national security, to include economic security as it relates to immigration,
as well as improving intelligence-gathering on terrorist travel methods by the immigration
system.
Brysk and Choi-Fitzpatrick (2012) and Hebert (2012, 100) assess Congressional
action as inadvertently victimizing trafficking victims, citing immigration reform focusing on
massive increases in border patrol and further securitization of what they categorize as a
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rights issue. Both studies approach the subject of human trafficking from the perspective of
gender bias and exploitation, and cite any characterization of trafficking as a national security
issue as further entrenching the problem.
Brems (2003, 96) notes that the European Court of Human Rights is more permissive
in accepting a state's discretion regarding human rights when they present a valid security
concern. Similar arguments are common in Asia, where many national leaders have appealed
to internal security requirements (Ronna 2012), Islamic law and customs, and differences
between "western values" and "Asian values (Asplund 2009)." Donnelly (2011, 499) notes
that the United Nations, Europe, and the west have developed capable multilateral human
rights mechanisms, such as the European Court of Human Rights, while Asia has no
established regional human rights mechanism, although he does acknowledge that the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is tentatively moving towards establishing
such a capability.
Scholars highlight the importance of Asia lacking an effective regional human rights
organization (Wotipka and Tsutsui 2008, 731; Donnelly 2011), which becomes important
when analyzing regional and national responses to human trafficking and national security.
Majid expresses concern that regional institutions are deteriorating in Southeast Asia, in the
context of a "strategic contest between China and the US in the region (Majid 2012, 81, 89)."
Corruption is a recurring theme in the literature of human trafficking, human rights,
and national security, with many scholars citing corruption as a necessary condition for illicit
activities to thrive. Poole-Robb and Bailey (2002) list corruption first among many dynamics
contributing to organized crime, trafficking, and the clandestine cross-border movement of
terrorists. Corruption is highly correlated with human trafficking (Bales 2006, 11 ), and good
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governance that is responsive to human rights must achieve some level of transparency and
accountability in its exercise of authority (Amador 2010, 609). Additionally, ASEAN has
demonstrated remarkably little interest in establishing regional institutions with any power to
compel compliance with policies. Several recurring themes emerge among scholars who find
resistance to empowering ASEAN as a regional regime, such as sovereignty and noninterference, varied concepts of security and threats to stability, and the concept of Asian
values and Islamic law, which places society before the individual (Poon 2001; Chau 2008;
Linton 2008, 482; Jetschke 2011; Simon 2012).
Culture is an important consideration when analyzing human rights in Asia. "Human
rights is fundamentally about ideas," which in turn influence state behaviors (Forsythe and
McMahon 2003, 311-312). "Human rights are essentially expressions of values (Hong 2000,
381)." Hong posits that Asians equally value human rights, but simply place emphasis on
different rights, such as economic, physical, and health security.
In the context of Southeast Asia, scholars observe the distinct weakness of national
and regional human rights institutions, and the cultural framing used by many leaders to
justify this disparity between east and west (Forsythe 2000, 392; Maunati and Suribidari
2003; Levine 2007). Human rights regimes must become institutionalized at multiple levels
of government before such rights will be realized at any significant level, moving beyond
hard law to become established within society as norms, policies, and behaviors, or soft laws
(Forsythe 2012, 14). In Southeast Asia, a common rebuff to advocates of greater human
rights enforcement has been Asian values (Forsythe and McMahon 2003, 297; Asplund 2009;
Ciorciari 2012, 700)."
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Yew cites Confucian values as a major factor resulting in differing application of
human rights in Asia (Yew 2000, 490-491). Yew insists that the order achieved by these
Confucian values is essential to successful emergence of a peaceful, successful, and
economically advancing society, and must precede western democratic values, for a truly
liberal democratic society to be realized (Yew 2000, 314). Zakaria (2002) disagrees on one
finer point of this argument, stating that it was not Confucius, but Lee Kwan Yew, who was
responsible for Singapore's success; order matters; economic liberalization before political,
copying 19th century Europe (ibid, 39).
Rich analyzes the influence of the Chinese diaspora in Southeast Asia, citing
examples of the Confucian concept ofjunzi, or the "superior, noble, cultured" person,
"working for the common good (Rich 2013, 187)." Rich observes that Thailand has a similar
Confucian concept, the phudi leadership style, that was prominent in the 1997 Thai
Constitution and sought to establish a Senate of virtuous men who were above politics and
hence, beyond corruption. Swanger (2014) supports these views, asserting that the Chinese
Confucian worldview bears a powerful influence throughout the Asia Pacific. Swanger cited
the estimation that approximately 70 percent of the economy in Asia is controlled by the
Chinese diaspora.
Nasu finds the Asian values debate has diminished in frequency since the 1990s,
while the rhetoric of the war on terror has become more common in justifying authoritarian
and repressive government behavior (2011, 3). Kingsbury (2011) also rejects Asian values,
finding varied rhetoric to alternately support human rights, or to justify repressive behavior.
Linton (2008) finds ASEAN to lack any common standards in protecting human rights, but
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posits that these reservations are more commonly justified based on specific domestic
reasons, equating to shirking behavior.
Baik, on the other hand, finds that human rights regimes are indeed emerging
throughout Asia (2012, 217). Baik examines 23 East Asian states to assess their emerging
human rights systems, including all ten ASEAN member states. He finds that Asia is rapidly
becoming regionally integrated, yet acknowledges that human rights are not yet sufficiently
institutionalized. However, Baik identifies the emerging regional and sub-regional
institutions as "incubators for broader social and cultural cooperation on human rights (2012,
297)."
Several scholars express concern regarding the influence of Islamic law, culture, and
politics in terms of both security and human rights (Singh 2007; Liow 2011; Mowatt-Larssen
2011). Islam plays a significant role in Southeast Asia. One scholar specifies that Islam has
relegated women to a secondary role, resulting in structural inequalities, although observing
that non-Muslim women in Indonesia have experienced similar circumstances (Mietzner
2013, 37). Singh (2007) cites Southeast Asian links to transnational terrorist organizations
such as al Qaeda, and recommends greater attention to countering the spread of extremist
ideology. Mowatt-Larssen (2011) conducts a survey ofrecent Islamic opinions regarding
nuclear weapons and nuclear terrorism, finding extensive evidence of support for extremist
ideology and religious justification for the use of WMD. Mowatt-Larssen identifies the lack
of research on the confluence of nuclear proliferation, terror, and religion (2011, 10).
Liow (2011) does not cite evidence of international terrorist groups in Southern
Thailand, where the countries' Muslim minority is concentrated and where a little known but
brutal insurgency has raged for several decades between separatist Muslims and the
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predominantly Buddhist government and military. Liow does document significant influence
of transnational Islamic influences, resulting in "fragmentation of traditional authorities
(Liow 2011, 1421 )," that he finds central to the historic resilience of Muslims in Southern
Thailand against global jihadi influences.
Horowitz, Poushter, and Barker (2011) report widespread distrust and
misunderstandings between the western world and the broader Muslim world, which
complicates application of regional and global efforts to cooperate on security and human
rights issues. They report on a broad longitudinal public perceptions survey, spanning 14
countries and more than 10,000 survey respondents. The report identifies many worsening
attitudes and perceptions since the terrorist attacks against the United States on September
11, 2001.
Liddle and Mujani (2009, 585) finds moderation in Indonesia's political Islam,
attributing this largely to President Suharto (1966-1998), noting that Indonesia's greater
concerns are with government incompetence and corruption (ibid 590).
Sovereignty and non-interference have been priorities in Southeast Asia since the end
of World War Two (WWII), with the demise of colonialism. Forsythe (2012, 21)
acknowledges the prevalence of the centuries-old Westphalian system, but dedicates
significant attention to the growing role of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), as well
as other for-profit private actors. Mohamad (2002) surveys the efforts of domestic civil
society and international NGOs towards establishing a human rights regime in ASEAN,
finding significant resistance due to strong commitments to national sovereignty.
Additionally, Mohamad examines four national human rights institutions within ASEAN:
Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, and Malaysia. His conclusions are consistent; a human
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rights regime is difficult to foster in the region because of the powerful national forces
defending sovereignty and autonomy. Mohamad identifies the "modern nation-state" as the
biggest obstacle to an ASEAN human rights regime (2002, 24 7).
Friedrichs (2012) describes this as an "Eastphalia" syndrome, although he does find
that, despite slow progress and widespread criticism, ASEAN is the most important
institution for maintaining regional security. Mietzner (2013) is more hopeful, finding
strength and growing influence in Indonesian civil society groups, including many who have
progressed from marginal influence in NGOs to operating within the government. This
importance comes with some urgency, as many view East Asia as having fragile regimes,
while facing multiple significant security challenges (Friedrichs 2012, 759).
Poon (2001) analyzes regionalism in ASEAN and the Asia Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC), finding the institutional design has been structured to engage the global
economy while rejecting supranational interference in domestic affairs. He documents
appeals to Asian values and ASEAN's tradition of noninterference, but also finds normative
influences resulting from this increased regional and international interaction that is creating
pressure on some of this shirking behavior.
Poon notes that the Philippines and Indonesia had already begun questioning the
veracity of consensus-building norms (Poon 2001, 257). Poon concludes that this
institutionalization of regional and international norms will place increasing pressure on
ASEAN and APEC regimes to continue liberal reforms.
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Chapter 2. Congressional Responses to Human Trafficking

On March 7, 2013, President Barack Obama signed into law the Trafficking Victims
Protection Reauthorization Act of 2013. This Act marked the fourth reauthorization of Public

Law 106-386, the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, previously
reauthorized in 2003, 2005, and 2008. These previous four bills had received near-unanimous
bipartisan support in both chambers of Congress, with only two nay votes out of more than
2,000 cumulative votes cast during the 106th, 108th, 109th, and I 10th Congresses. In the I 12th
Congress, this decade of legislative success ended.
Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT) sponsored S.1301, the Trafficking Victims Protection
Reauthorization Act of 2011, accumulating 15 Republicans amongst the bill's cosponsors.

Despite such broad support in the past, and bipartisan cosponsorship from 56 senators in the
112th Congress, the bill was not reauthorized, which allowed appropriated funding and
authorities designed to combat human trafficking to lapse for the first time in a decade. When
the bill finally passed in 2013 as an amendment to Public Law 113-4, the Violence Against
Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, the historic near-unanimity from previous TVPRA bills

was gone. This case provides a unique opportunity to examine how anti-trafficking
legislation is created. To better understand how human rights laws are created, I first examine
which members of Congress are active on the issue of human trafficking. Who were the key
actors on the issue of human trafficking during the 112th and 113th Congresses? I will then
seek confirm the veracity of the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: If members of Congress (MC) generally view human trafficking as a human

rights issue (and not as a security issue), then liberals are more likely to support human
trafficking bills than conservative MC.
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Hypothesis 2: Members of Congress who emphasize women's rights, sexual exploitation,
and the human rights aspect of human trafficking will oppose correlation of human
trafficking with national security (or the securitization of trafficking legislation).
The 1121h Congress demonstrated significant ideological polarization, in large part
due to disagreements over tax and budget solutions to the 2008 financial crisis (Matthews
2013). Much of the perceived gridlock in recent years has been attributed to partisan political
battles waged over national deb_t, economic stimulus, budget deficits, and taxation. While
these issues amplified polarization in the United States, and partisan politics certainly
influenced the failure of S.1301, these divisive factors also provide a unique opportunity to
examine another significant motivation in the Senate: personal policy interests.
Scholars and political activists tend to view human trafficking primarily through the
lens of human rights, or as a national security issue, as the review of previous literature
indicated (Avery and Forsythe 1979; Brysk and Choi-Fitzpatrick 2012; and Hebert (2012,
100). This case study provides a unique opportunity to analyze policy preferences in the
Senate; specifically, to assess whether senators during the 112th and 113th Congresses
demonstrate an observable preference towards either national security, or human trafficking,
or whether they appear to effectively accommodate both.
Method
In this chapter I analyze senators of the 112th and 113th Congresses, examining their
legislative activity and language relating to human trafficking. I focus my study primarily on
two bills and six senators. I initially searched the Congressional Record for human
trafficking bills, amendments, and resolutions during the period of study, to identify which
senators were most active on the issue of human trafficking. I utilized the Library of
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Congress sites Thomas.gov, Congress.gov, as well as GovTrack.us, to identify relevant bills
and Congressional activity. I then selected two senators each from this group who are viewed
as either liberal or conservative stalwarts. To select senators who represent these ideological
groups, I examined DW-Nominate scores, and scores from the American Conservative Union
(ACU) and Americans for Democratic Action (ADA). I also identified two senators who tend
towards the center of these same measures, who were also active in human trafficking
legislation. I then analyzed selected content to examine policy motivations and preferences,
examining the Congressional record and available public media and documents. See Table
2.1 below for list of senators selected for this case study.

Table 2.1 Selected Senators Active on Human Trafficking Legislation, 112th and 113th
Congresses, and their ideological ratings
2013

Lifetime
Score

Years in
Senate
2013

100

4

6

39

7

100

4

3

31

87

89

0

96

93

11

RUBIO (R-FL)

94

94

5

96

99

3

KIRK (R-IL)

59

61

40

44

57

12

COLLINS (R-ME)

56

58

50

28

48

17

DWNOMINATE

DWNOMINATE

2012

2013

LEAHY (D-VT)

13

BOXER (D-CA)

ADA

ACU

2013

18

2

CORNYN (R-TX)

BILL

ACU

ADA-Americans for Democratic Action
ACU- American Conservative Union

The Senators and their Legislation
The primary human trafficking bill I examine is S.1301, the Trafficking Victims
Protection Reauthorization Act of 2011 (hereafter referred to as TVPRA-2011 ). The bill,
which originated in the 112th Congress, was sponsored by Patrick Leahy (D-VT), but died
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during that Congress. The second bill, S.47, the Violence Against Women Reauthorization
Act of 2013 (hereafter referred to as the VAWRA-2013), was also sponsored by Leahy. The
VAWRA-2013 is significant to this study because it was to this bill that Leahy attached the
TVPRA as an amendment, to get both reauthorizations passed in 2013. This was an ironic
tum of events; the VA WA originated in 1994, but had passed reauthorization in in 2000 as
Division B of the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000. In 2000, the
VA WA reauthorization was attached to the new and broadly supported TVPA in part
because the VAWA had just lost United States v. Morrison, a Supreme Court case that had
struck down portions of the Act for exceeding Congressional authorities under the Commerce
Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution (U.S. White House 2014). The
VAWA had also failed reauthorization in 2011, just as had S.1301, the TVPRA. Hence, these
two bills had a long history together.
LEAHY:

Patrick Leahy (D-VT) entered the U.S. Senate in 1975, making him the most senior
serving senator at the time of this study. Leahy has a long history of human rights legislation,
to include the influential "Leahy Law," introduced in 1997, which requires the Department of
State and the Department of Defense to conduct human rights vetting for foreign military or
security personnel and their units, prior to receiving training, equipment, or other types of
assistance funded by the United States government. Leahy views human rights as central to
his reputation as a member of Congress, based on his Senate biography, which emphasizes
his work on human rights issues, ranging from opposition to landmines to relief for war
victims (Leahy 2014). Leahy sponsored the most prominent human trafficking legislation
during the period of study, and as chair of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, was in
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position to shepherd the bill through Congress. Despite this crucial role in advancing human
rights legislation, he was not the most prolific sponsor of human trafficking legislation during
the 113th Congress.
CORNYN:

Senator John Cornyn (R-TX) was the most prolific senator of legislation targeting
human trafficking during the l l 3th Congress, sponsoring six bills. Several other senators
sponsored as many as two trafficking bills, but none sponsored as many as Cornyn, or
gathered nearly as many cosponsors for their bills. Cornyn entered the Senate in 2002, having
previously served in Texas as a state supreme court justice, and as the state attorney general.
Comyn demonstrated his interest in combatting human trafficking in 2004, when he
introduced Senate Resolution 414 (S.Res.414), A resolution encouraging States to consider

adopting comprehensive legislation to combat human trafficking and slavery and recognizing
the many efforts made to combat human trafficking and slavery, with three democratic
cosponsors. The resolution achieved a unanimous vote. Cornyn has cosponsored multiple
bipartisan human trafficking bills, including Senator Joseph Biden's (D-DE) Violence

Against Women Act of 2005, Senator Diane Feinstein's (D-CA) S.Con.Res.40, Supporting the
goals and ideals of observing the National Day of Human Trafficking Awareness on January
11 of each year to raise awareness of and opposition to human trafficking, in 2007, and again
cosponsored Feinstein's Congressional resolution when she reintroduced it in 2009. Comyn
was the original cosponsor of S. 2925 (111 th): Domestic Minor Sex Trafficking Deterrence

and Victims Support Act of 2010, with Ron Wyden (D-OR), and again in 2011, when the bill
was reintroduced. Based on frequent association of human trafficking with liberal political
ideology, Comyn was the first surprise of this case study.
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Table 2.2 Recent Human Trafficking and National Security Bills Sponsored by Senator
Cornyn (R-TX)
BILL
S.178 ( ll 41h)
S.413(113 1h)
S.1354(113th)
S.1738 (I 13th)
S.2611 (l l3 1h)
S.2743 (I 13th)
S.2773 (I 13th)
S.Res.414
(1081h)
s.1387 (I 081h)
S. l 028(l121h)
S.Res.494 ( l l21h)

TITLE
Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act of2015
Human Trafficking Reporting Act of2013
End Sex Trafficking Act of 2013
Justice for Victims ofTraffickin~ Act of 2013
Helping Unaccompanied Minors and Alleviating
National Emergency Act
Protecting Children and America's Homeland Act of
2014
Protecting Children and America's Homeland Act of
2014
A resolution encouraging States to consider adopting
comprehensive legislation to combat human trafficking
and slavery and recognizing the many efforts made to
combat human trafficking and slavery.
Border Security and Immigration Reform Act of 2003
Foreign-Held Debt Transparency and Threat
Assessment Act
A resolution condemning the Government of the
Russian Federation for providing weapons to the
regime of President Bashar al-Assad of Syria.

cosponsors
34 (13-D, 21-R)
7 (4-D, 3-R)
1 (1-D)
27 (12-D, 15-R)
11 (11-R)
10 (10-R)
2 (2-R)

4 (3-D, 1-R)
1-R
1-R
15 (6-D, 9-R)

BOXER:
Senator Barbara Boxer (D-CA) was active on human trafficking during the 1121h and
113th Congresses. Boxer sponsored S.121 during the 113th Congress, a bill to Establish the

United States Advisory Council on Human Trafficking to review Federal Government policy
on human trafficking, which would have established a non-governmental advisory board. The
bill was referred to committee with no cosponsors, and died in Congress. Boxer sponsored
previous anti-trafficking legislation, including S.185, the Child Protection Compact Act of

2011, which had died during the I 12th Congress. Boxer's similar bill, S.13 84, also died in the
11 lth Congress, but she later saw core provisions of this bill included in S.47, Leahy's

Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, the same law that included the
Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act. These bills indicate the level of support
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Boxer has given to trafficking legislation, although further analysis indicates a slightly
different focus.
Boxer ranks among the top ten senators for gaining passage of her bills in recent
years. While this is partly a function of serving more than two decades in the Senate, it also
reflects on several other factors. A review of these bills, and related trafficking bills she
cosponsored or was active on, reveals a consistency in advocating for women and children,
with heavy emphasis on the more shocking aspects of exploitation. For example, S.3184, the
Child Protection Compact Act of 2010, during the 11 lth Congress, cites United Nations
Children's Fund (UNICEF) estimates that more than 150 million children age 14 and
younger experience severe forms of child labor, and the International Labor Organization
(ILO) estimate that nearly two million children are exploited for pornography or sex every
year. Boxer sponsored S.2307 during the 113th Congress, the International Violence Against
Women Act of 2014, which references Congressional findings that "an estimated 1 out of
every 3 women throughout the world will be beaten, coerced into sex, or otherwise abused in
her lifetime," along with additional statistics emphasizing exploitation and abuse of women
and girls. A survey of Boxer's committee debate and public statements reveals her consistent
and passionate advocacy for women and children.
It is not surprising to find that the majority of Boxer's bill sponsorship and

cosponsorship focus on human rights issues, with emphasis on women and children's health.
Avery and Forsythe (1979) find a strong and negative correlation between a senator's
national security orientation and their likelihood of voting for human rights bills. Based on
these findings, one might expect Boxer to be less active on national security legislation.
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Table 2.3 Recent Human Trafficking and National Security Bills Sponsored by Senator
Boxer (D-CA)
BILL
S.713(I14th)
S.121 (113th)
S.2307 ( 1l31h)
S.185 (l l21h)
S.3477(l121h)
S.3184 (11 lth)
S.2673 (113 1h)
S.2703 (l l3 1h)
S.2165 ( l l21h)

TITLE: Bills sponsored by Boxer
International Violence Against Women Act of 2015
a bill to Establish the United States Advisory Council on
Human Trafficking to review Federal Government policy
on human trafficking
International Violence Against Women Act of2014
Child Protection Compact Act of 2011
Women, Peace, and Security Act of 2012
Child Protection Compact Act of 2010
United States-Israel Strategic Partnership Act of 2014
Military SAFE Standards Act
United States-Israel Enhanced Security Cooperation Act
of2012

cosponsors
10 (2-R, 7-D, 1-1)
none
30 (2-R, 27-D, 1-1)
8 (3-R, 5-D)
13 (3-R, 10-D)
27 (6-R, 21-D)
80 (32-R, 47-D, 1-1)
2 (1-R, 1-D)
72 (35-R, 36-D, 1-I)

Boxer's committee assignments include the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and
a cursory look indicates she sponsored or cosponsored quite a few bills on defense and
national security. A closer look indicates many of these bills focus on health issues, and
issues affecting women and children; essentially, human security issues. For example, a
search for national security bills on the Thomas.gov web site resulted in Boxer's S.2703
(I 13th), the Military SAFE Standards Act. This bill would mandate requirements for the
Departments of Defense and Homeland Security to establish, train, and empower sexual
assault forensic examiners (SAFE). While S.2703 would have a long-term indirect impact on
national security, the bill illustrates Boxer's emphasis on women's rights, even in the context
of national security and defense-related legislation.
While this study does not replicate the quantitative analysis of Avery and Forsythe,
the selected senators will provide case studies to examine the correlation between policy
preferences of both national security and human trafficking, as a proxy for the broader
category of human rights.
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RUBIO:

Senator Marco Rubio (R-FL) is the youngest senator studied in this chapter, having
entered the United States Senate in 2011. Rubio sponsored S.1823, the Strengthening the
Child Welfare Response to Human Trafficking Act of 2013, during the 113th Congress, as
well as cosponsoring S.413, Cornyn's Human Trafficking Reporting Act of 2013, and Senator
Richard Blumenthal's S.2234, the End Trafficking in Government Contracting Act of2012,
during the I 12th Congress. Rubio was active on multiple national security bills, as well,
including several sponsored by liberal senators, such as Senator Robert Menendez's (D-NJ)
S.298, the North Korea Nonproliferation and Accountability Act of 2013, Senator Jeanne
Shaheen's (D-NH) S.2329, the Hezbollah International Financing Prevention Act of 2014.
One final bill on which Rubio was active during the I 13th Congress was Senator Chuck
Schumer's (D-NY) S.744, the Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration
Modernization Act. Rubio served as one of the "gang of eight" select senators charged with
negotiating this controversial bill. S.744 passed the Senate on June 27, 2013, but was not
voted in the House. This omnibus bill contains 1, 198 pages, and addresses multiple aspects
of immigration and border security, to include human smuggling and trafficking, but the bill
continues to spark broad debate about national security. Rubio directly links human rights
and national security in a public commentary on the passage of the TVPRA; "We also cannot
ignore the human trafficking tragedy that takes place along our Southern Border, which is
why fixing our immigration system and implementing stronger border security measures are
key to combating the human trafficking operations that have led to so much death and
suffering (Rubio 2013)."
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Rubio scored among the top ten most conservative senators by DW-Nominate in 2012
and 2013, and among the most conservative according to both the American Conservative
Union (ACU) and Americans for Democratic Action (ADA). Nevertheless, Rubio
cosponsored many bipartisan bills during the 112th and 113th Congresses, to include multiple
human trafficking and human rights bills. Rubio rounds out this study as the fourth
ideological senator.
This chapter will also observe relevant activity from two senators who are
ideologically more centrist, and have been active on human trafficking legislation.
COLLINS I KIRK:
Senator Susan Collins (R-ME) cosponsored both S.1301 and S.47, the two Leahy
bills under study, as well as S.1738, Comyn's Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act of 2013,
and S.2307, Boxer's International Violence Against Women Act of 2014. Collins, who joined
the United States Senate in 1997, ranked 58th on DW-Nominate scores for the 113th
Congress, yet holds a 31 % lifetime ACU rating, and was listed by the ACU as the least
conservative Republican senator of the 113th Congress. Senator Mark Kirk (R-IL) ranked 6I5t
on DW-NOMINATE scores, while holding a 57% lifetime ACU score, based on 12 years of
Congressional activity. Kirk cosponsored Leahy's S.1301 and S.47, as well as joining Collins
as the only other Republican to cosponsor Boxer's S.2307, along with 27 Democratic and
one Independent senator. Kirk also cosponsored S.2941 during the 113th Congress, the

Combat Human Trafficking Act of 2014, which was introduced by Senator Diane Feinstein
(D-CA) only weeks before the 113th Congress retired. Kirk again cosponsored the bill, along
with Comyn, when Feinstein introduced the same bill as S.140, in the opening weeks of the
114th Congress. While Kirk has not sponsored many bills targeting human trafficking, he did
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introduce S.2767 during the 113 1h Congress, the Combating Fraudulent Child Transfers Act,
and several bills and resolutions directly focused on human rights in Iran and North Korea.
Kirk, who joined the United States Senate in 2010, ranked 6151 on DW-Nominate scores for
the 113th Congress. Kirk established the Senate Human Rights Caucus, along with Senator
Chris Coons (D-DE), in September 2014.
These two moderate Republican senators have been active on the issue of human trafficking,
and more broadly on human rights issues.
Analysis and Findings
While she has been active on human trafficking, Collins has also been at the center of
significant national security legislation. In 2004, Collins sponsored S.2845, the Intelligence
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (P.Law 108.458), which became Public Law 108-458
less than three months later. P.Law 108-458 identified human trafficking as a threat to
national security, and served as a Congressional forcing function to direct the executive
branch to better integrate its various directorates. This law codified the Office of the Director
of National Intelligence (DNI), as well as the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), and
resulted from executive and legislative activity immediately following the release of the 9111
Commission Report (Zelikow, Jenkins and May 2004).
In section 7201 of P.Law 108-458, Counterterrorist Travel Intelligence, Congress
finds that "travel documents are as important to terrorists as weapons," and directs the NCTC
to establish a strategy to coordinate interagency efforts to better understand vulnerabilities to
the United States that can be exploited by terrorists, as well as human smugglers and
traffickers, and transnational criminal organizations. Section 7202 codified the establishment
of the Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center, and directed the center to provide direct
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support to the NCTC. Section 7202 made mandatory the interagency office and team that had
originally been announced in December 2000 (DeStefano 2008, 51, 128-141). Section 7202
mandated specific actions from multiple executive agencies, creating the institutional
framework for effective task organization, as well as far greater sharing and collating of
information. This public law serves as an excellent example of Congress performing a
forcing function, which is clearly documented in the HSTC report. This report,
"Establishment of the Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center: a Report to Congress,"
dated 16 June 2005, "as required by Section 7202(d) of the 'Intelligence Reform and

Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, "' identified "significant progress" integrating intelligence
and information systems across multiple agencies, and further clarified that much work
remained to be done.
Collins served as the chairman of the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs Committee, and co-authored P.Law 108-458 with Senator Joe Lieberman (D-CT),
placing her at the heart oflegislative debates regarding national security. Collins was actively
involved in national security debates, and yet remained active in human rights legislation, as
well; she cosponsored fourteen pieces of human rights legislation during the 1081h Congress.
Despite his prolific legislative activity focused on combatting human trafficking,
Cornyn voted against favorably presenting S.1301 (TVPRA-2011) to the Senate, as amended.
Cornyn and Kyl provided minority views in Senate Report 112-96, reported from the
Committee on the Judiciary, which was chaired by Leahy during the 112th Congress. In their
dissent, Cornyn and Kyl expressed the view that sex trafficking of children should be a top
government priority, but indicated the bill provided "inadequate funding, protections, and
law enforcement tools to manage this challenge (Senate Report 112-96, 2011, 32)." Cornyn
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and Kyl proposed an amendment to S.1301 to add in its entirety the language of S.596, the
Domestic Minor Sex Trafficking Deterrence and Victims Support Act, which would have

provided increased block fund grants to state and local governments, as well as increase law
enforcement training and funding, for those investigating and prosecuting sex offenses
against children. The Comyn/Kyl Amendment was rejected by the Judiciary Committee, with
a roll call vote of 7 Yeas and 11 Nays, voted along party lines, except for Senator Chuck
Grassley(R-IA). The committee then voted to report S.1301 favorably to the Senate, by a
vote of 12 Yeas and 6 Nays, again along party lines, excepting Grassley and Senator Orrin
Hatch (R-UT).
This committee debate is interesting in that it did not divide based on budget and
deficit ideological lines, while it did divide along party lines; Senator Grassley (R-IA) was
the only Republican to vote Yea on the committee support. The Senate report notes that
Grassley, who was then the ranking member of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, had
worked with Leahy to ensure concerns with the TVPRA's grant programs had been
addressed. This split leaves the question of whether the TVPRA-2011 was partisan in its
nature, but a review of proposed amendments indicates a more nuanced assessment.
A previous version of the Domestic Minor Sex Trafficking Deterrence and Victims
Support Act, the bill Comyn and Kyl proposed including in the TVPRA-2011, had passed

both chambers of the 111 th Congress, but had not been reconciled, and had subsequently died
in that Congress. Both S.2925 and S.596 had been sponsored by Ron Wyden (D-OR), with
strong Democrat Party support. Comyn was the only Republican senator to cosponsor both
bills. During committee debate on S.1301, Comyn and Kyl were actually proposing an
increase to the appropriated funds for S.1301, purporting to further strengthen Leahy's bill,
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by resurrecting Wyden's bill. Again, Comyn provides an example of an ideologically
conservative and partisan politician actively advocating human rights legislation, to include
bills sponsored by liberal stalwarts, despite evidence of historic polarization in Congress
(McCarty 2014; Matthews 2014; Dimock et al 2014).
Senators proposed six amendments to S.47, Leahy's Violence Against Women
Reauthorization Act, which indicate some variance to the partisan divide during the 113th

Congress. Two of the amendments received near-unanimous support, with Senator Ron
Portman (R-OH) garnering 100 supporting votes for his amendment To clarifj; that child
victims ofsex trafficking are eligible to receive assistance under grants provided to enhance
the safety ofyouth and children. Leahy's amendment, S.Amdt.21, to authorize appropriations

for the TVPRA for fiscal years 2014-2017, received 93 affirmative votes, with only five
Republicans voting nay, and two senators not voting; John McCain (R-AZ), and Kirsten
Gillibrand (D-NY). While Democrats remained unified throughout voting on S.47, the
Republican vote broke down further with the remaining four amendments. All four of these
amendments were proposed by Republican senators, and each was rejected.
Senator Tom Coburn (R-OK) proposed three amendments to S.47, while Grassley
proposed one. Coburn' s S.Amdt.13, To reaffirm the inalienable rights of every American
citizen guaranteed by the Constitution ... , sought to remove a provision of the VAWRA that

would have allowed tribal courts jurisdiction over non-tribal U.S. citizens. Coburn stated
during testimony before the Senate that many tribal courts do not allow for appeals to state
and federal courts, and that some tribal courts have held that they are not subject to certain
U.S. Constitutional Amendments, or certain elements of the Bill of Rights. All Democratic
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Party senators rejected this amendment, as did four Republican Party senators, to include
Collins and Kirk. Furthermore, ten additional Republican senators chose not to vote.
Coburn's second amendment, S.Amdt.15, To more quickly resolve rape cases and
reduce the deficit by consolidating unnecessary duplication ... , claimed to increase law
enforcement and investigative efficiency while cutting costs by reducing wasteful duplication
of efforts across the federal government. Critics, including Leahy, expressed concern that the
amendment would strip funding from other justice priorities, in effect diminishing
protections for vulnerable populations that the bill sought to shore up. The amendment was
accepted by all Republican Party senators, and rejected by nearly all Democratic Party
senators, with the exception of two; Claire McCaskill (D-MO), and Joe Manchin (D-WV),
supported this amendment. The amendment failed by a vote of 46-53.
Coburn's third amendment was S.Amdt.16, sought to require more speedy
notification of victims of rape to their potential exposure to HIVIAIDS, by allowing for
testing of assailants, and by providing treatment to those at risk of disease due to rape. The
vote again followed party lines, with only two Democrats voting for the amendment, and four
Republicans rejecting it. Again, two of the Republican senators who broke with their party
were Collins and Kirk.
Grassley submitted S.Amdt.14, In the nature of a substitute, which would have
removed language from the reauthorization bill that specifically named lesbian, gay,
bisexual, and transgendered (LGBT) individuals as a special or separate group. During
Senate debate, Grassley expressed support for the bill, while highlighting several areas of
specific concern. Specifically, Grassley stated that the bill would raise revenues, and hence
violated the Constitution's origination clause. Grassley also alluded to "more controversial"
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measures, again describing these as unconstitutional, for" ... excluding various groups from
protection under the law. You know why? Because current law protects all victims (C-SPAN
2013)." Grassley dedicated much of his floor time to addressing concerns about sovereignty
and jurisdiction concerns vis-a-vis Indian tribal courts, the same issue more thoroughly
addressed by Coburn.
This amendment elicited the greatest break from party lines, with Democrats unified,
but ten Republicans joining Democrats in rejecting this amendment. Collins and Kirk again
crossed party lines, consistent with their more moderate ideological ratings, but several
conservative stalwarts also rejected the amendment, to include Rubio, but also Rand Paul (RKY) and Ted Cruz (R-TX), who both topped the 2013 DW-NOMINATE list with scores of
100, and were both rated 100 percent lifetime scores by the ACU, in their 2015 ratings.
Analysis of the Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 20 I 3, associated
amendments proposed for S.47, and debates and roll call votes, reveals some of the issues
which contributed to partisan polarization, as well as the issues which caused MC to break
from their party. Collins and Kirk repeatedly voted contrary to their party, consistent with
their more moderate ideological ratings. Analysis of Collins' floor debate supports the
hypothesis that more liberal MC would vote for human rights legislation. Collins cited data
from law enforcement officials when she identified concerns about domestic violence and
drugs as the greatest reasons for her support for the VA WRA. She specifically rejected the
idea that this is a partisan issue, and lauded workers in the public sector, such as law
enforcement, educators, and health care workers, in addressing violence against women.
During floor debate in February 2013, when S.47 and the various amendments were
being debated and voted in the Senate, I found no references of Collins or Kirk focusing on
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the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act, which was passed as part of the
VAWRA. On the other hand, Rubio utilized his floor time to talk exclusively of the TVPRA,
advocating the importance of combatting not just sex trafficking, but also labor trafficking.
Rubio stated that the United States lacks awareness of the problem, but that the nation also
stands as an example globally for confronting trafficking in persons.
What About National Security?
I found no direct legislative discussion identifying either bill, the VA WRA or the
TVPRA, as national security issues. This study does support the hypothesis that liberal MC
are more likely to support human trafficking bills than conservative, but also indicates that
the opposite is not necessarily true. Several of the most active senators during the I 12th and
113th Congresses on the issue of human trafficking were among the most conservative

ideologically, with Comyn serving as the most prominent example. But is the opposite true? I
did find conservative Senators focused more on security issues, while liberal Senators
emphasized women's rights and human rights aspects of legislation, but I also found liberal
Senators to be active in sponsoring and cosponsoring national security bills. Table 2.4 lists a
sampling of bills introduced during the 113th Congress that emerged during my research.
Upon reviewing these findings, I revised Table 2.1, which listed the Senators I focused my
human trafficking case study on, and added more of the senators who emerged as active in
national security legislation, to further analyze the ideological spectrum covered by active
Senators in both spheres. See Table 2.5 for updated list of Senators and their ideological
scores.
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Table 2.4 Sampling of National Security Bills, 113th Congress
BILL
S.744
S.1535
S.1881
S.298
S.1885
S.1681
S.2329
S.2673
S.2703
S.1917
S.2277
S.2463
S.2561
S.2869

TITLE
Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and
Immigration Modernization Act
Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act
Nuclear Weapon Free Iran Act of2013
North Korea Nonproliferation and Accountability
Act of2013
Burma Human Rights and Democracy Act of2013
Intelligence Authorization Act of2014
Hezbollah International Financing Prevention Act
of2014
United States-Israel Strategic Partnership Act of
2014
Military SAFE Standards Act
Victims Protection Act of2014
Russian Aggression Prevention Act 2014
Keep Our Communities Safe Act of 2014
Human Smuggling Prevention Act of2014
Counterterrorism Border Security Enhancement
Act

SPONSOR
Schumer (D-NY)
Schumer (D-NY)
Menendez (D-NJ)
Menendez (D-NJ)

COSPONSORS
7 (4-R, 3-D)
15 (7-R, 8-D)
59 (43-R, 16-D)
9 (3-R, 6-D)

Menendez (D-NJ)
Feinstein (D-CA)
Shaheen (D-NH)

4 (3-R, 1-D)
none

Boxer (D-CA)

80 (32-R, 47-D, 1I)
2 (1-R, 1-D)
3-R
26-R
5-R
1-R

Boxer (D-CA)
McCaskill (D-MO)
Corker (R-TN)
Inhofe (R-OK)
McCain (R-AZ)
Coats (R-IN)

57 (31-R, 26-D)

none

While this study focused primarily on human trafficking legislation, I conducted a
limited survey of national security bills introduced in the Senate during the I 12th and I 13th
Congresses. Liberal Senators sponsored ten of the fourteen bills surveyed, and garnered
substantial numbers of cosponsors, frequently with bipartisan support. Several surprises
emerged, which challenge assumptions that conservatives are focused on defense, while
liberals are focused on human rights. Several of the more active Senators on the issue of
national security were Menendez and Schumer, while Feinstein was an active leader, serving
as the Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. These findings require a
more thorough quantitative and qualitative analysis, but do present a different picture from
what I anticipated, based on my review of literature.
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As noted previously, Boxer focused extensively on women's rights and sexual
exploitation, both when debating trafficking bills, and on national security legislation. On the
other hand, Boxer sponsored two significant national security bills, S.2673, the United
States-Israel Strategic Partnership Act of 2014, and S.2165, the United States-Israel
Enhanced Security Cooperation Act of 2012 (see Table 2.3), both of which achieved broad
bipartisan cosponsorship in the Senate and were signed by the President, after unanimous
votes in both chambers of Congress. Boxer, along with the moderates Kirk and Collins,
cosponsored Shaheen's S.2329, the Hezbollah International Financing Prevention Act of
2014, along with 29 other Republican senators. These serve as prominent examples of
bipartisan cooperation in both spheres of national security, and human trafficking.
Nevertheless, ideological differences remain.
McCaskill's S.1917, the Victims Protection Act of 2014, similar to Boxer's Military
SAFE Standards Act, while meeting search criteria in Thomas.gov as national security and
homeland security legislation, sought to enhance sexual assault prevention and response
mechanisms in the military. Both bills indicate a policy preference of their sponsors, but here
again, further analysis reveals a more nuanced picture than assumptions of a highly polarized
113 th Congress would indicate. McCaskill' s bill gained three cosponsors, all Republicans, to
include Comyn. McCaskill was one of only two Democrats to support Coburn' s S.Amdt.15,
To more quickly resolve rape cases and reduce the deficit by consolidating unnecessary
duplication.
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Table 2.5 Selected Senators active on National Security and Human Trafficking Legislation,
112th and 113th Congresses, and their ideological scores

Senator
MENENDEZ (D-NJ)
SCHUMER (D-NY)
FEINSTEIN (D-CA)
SHAHEEN (D-NH)
LEAHY (D-VT)
BOXER (D-CA)
CORNYN (R-TX)
RUBIO (R-FL)
KIRK(R-IL)

DWNOMINATE

DWNOMINATE

2012
17
21
36
33

2013
21
25
39
36
18
7
89
94
61
58

13

2
87
94
59
56

COLLINS (R-ME)
ADA- Americans for Democratic Action
ACU- American Conservative Union

ADA

ACU

2013

2013

95
95
100
90
100
100
0
5
40
50

4
4
4
8
4
4
96
96
44
28

ACU
Lifetime
Score

8
5
8
5
6
3
93
99
57
48

Years in
Senate

2013
21
33
21
5
39
31
11

3
12
17

This study has identified the value of case studies, as well as the limitations of purely
qualitative analysis. Only six members of the Senate were examined, and in a limited
capacity. While beyond the scope of this study, a quantitative analysis of the same
Congresses will provide a longitudinal analysis of Congressional policy preference. I hope to
adapt Avery and Forsythe's 1979 study, "Human Rights, National Security, and the U.S.
Senate: Who Votes For What, and Why." Human trafficking provides a unique focal point
for analyzing human rights, and the United States intelligence community has recently
emphasized the correlation between human trafficking and national security, making this a
timely and valuable opportunity to build on the existing body of work. Our nation stands to
gain by better understanding how we create effective policy to advance our national values,
while maintaining a vibrant and safe nation.

Summary and Conclusion
Based on my review ofliterature, I developed the following hypothesis:
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Hypothesis 1: If members of Congress (MC) view human trafficking as a human rights issue

(and not as a security issue), then liberals are more likely to support human trafficking bills
than conservative MC.
This case study finds Senators across the liberal-conservative spectrum who are
active on the issue of human trafficking, as measured by bill sponsorship and cosponsorship.
Further content analysis confirms that conservatives, liberals, and moderates alike describe
trafficking in human rights terms, but Comyn proved to be the most active in sponsoring
trafficking bills during the period of study. While I found little evidence of Senators defining
human trafficking primarily as a national security threat, the Senators along the liberal
spectrum demonstrate more consistent emphasis on human rights and civil liberties, while the
conservative Senators tended to associate trafficking with border security and national
security more frequently.
Hypothesis 2: Members of Congress who emphasize women's rights, sexual exploitation,

and the human rights aspect of human trafficking will oppose correlation of human
trafficking with national security (or the securitization of trafficking legislation)
This study did find a qualitative difference, with liberal senators expounding more
extensively on women's rights. On the other hand, the conservative Comyn sponsored more
bills focused on human trafficking than did any two liberal senators combined, during the
period of study (see Table 2.2). Additionally, liberal senators sponsored significant national
security legislation, and achieved success in garnering bipartisan support for those bills.
These findings indicate a more nuanced view of policy preference than A very and
Forsythe found, and more cooperation than anticipated, based on recent analysis identifying
the I 12th and I 13th Congresses as the most polarized ever (Matthews 2013; McCarty 2014).
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It is possible that the definition of a conservative has changed, certainly since Avery and

Forsythe's 1979 study, which demonstrated that the labels of conservative or liberal were
powerful indicators of who was more or less likely to support human rights legislation.
Another possibility is that perceptions of national security threats have changed significantly
in the past decade, as compared to the 1970's, when Avery and Forsythe conducted their
research. The field of research will benefit from additional analysis to compare direct shifts
in longitudinal data, as well as qualitative differences, which might highlight changes in
threat perceptions, as well as changes within the legislature.

Chapter 3:
The ASEAN Human Rights Declaration and Human Trafficking:
Rhetoric or Real Protection?
Southeast Asia is a diverse region packed with many contradictions and nuance,
perhaps best reflected in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). ASEAN
plays a central role as the dominant regional institution in Southeast Asia (Lin 2010). On
November 19, 2012, ASEAN adopted the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration (AHRD),
including Article 13, which declares "No person shall be held in servitude or slavery in any
of its forms, or be subject to human smuggling or trafficking in persons, including for the
purposes of trafficking in human organs (ASEAN 2012)." The AHRD contains much of the
liberal language of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), which is
ostensibly a major normative development in a region known for human rights abuses
(Linton 2008; Asplund 2009; ETAN 2014). Yet, since being formed in 1967, ASEAN has
remained committed to the principles of state sovereignty and non-interference in the
domestic affairs of other states. Consensus building has been, and remains, a central principle
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to ASEAN proceedings, thus suppressing robust debate and public pressures for reform.
ASEAN reaffirmed these same principles in the Preamble to the 2007 ASEAN Charter
(ASEAN 2007). This apparent contradiction leads to the question of whether the ASEAN
Human Rights Declaration indicates rhetoric or real change, which might elevate human
rights to a central, rather than peripheral, role in the region.
ASEAN countries have long struggled with political consolidation and domestic
stability, often appealing to security concerns as well as Asian values, emphasizing
community and authority as preeminent over individual liberties. The AHRD declares rights
that are contradictory to traditional "Asian values," (ASEAN, 2012, articles 19, 22-23),
creating political dissonance between traditional power structures and civil society. Leaders
in ASEAN must navigate this tension between human rights rhetoric and political stability.
ASEAN is the dominant regional institution in Southeast Asia, and has been
alternately criticized and praised for progressively developing liberal institutions, and
conversely for being primarily a "shop talk" institution, too weak to effect meaningful
change (Terada 2011 ). Yet, the AHRD appears to be a bold step towards establishing human
rights institutions that are "irreversible ... through which member states will be held to
account (Southwick 2013, l)." This chapter asks what causes regional or international
organizations to act to prevent human trafficking. Specifically, what factors caused ASEAN
to adopt the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration, with its broad liberal human rights rhetoric,
despite traditional ASEAN commitments to the principles of sovereignty, non-interference,
and consensus. In this chapter I will analyze ASEAN as a regional institution by adapting
Young's (1982) framework for studying regime dynamics. I will conduct a case study
(George 1979) of the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration to better understand the broader
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evolution of human rights norms in Southeast Asia, for it is within this context that human
trafficking norms are being addressed.
ASEAN
ASEAN was founded in 1967, in the wake of a bloody border conflict between
Indonesia and Malaysia, and in the broader context of the Cold War, which was decidedly
hot in Southeast Asia (Drakeley 2005). Five countries initially formed ASEAN: Indonesia,
Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, and the Philippines. This system was loosely modeled on the
European Union. The organization grew to include five additional member states, Brunei
Darussalam (1984), Vietnam (1995), Laos and Myanmar (1997), and Cambodia (1999),
becoming one of the most ethnically, linguistically, economically, politically, and religiously
diverse regional communities in the world. This complexity is matched by a complex web of
organizations, such as the ASEAN Plus Three cooperative framework, established in 1997
between ASEAN and three East Asian economic powers, China, Japan, and South Korea.
These relationships illustrate the dynamic interplay between security and economy, and the
tension between domestic and regional interests.
Southeast Asia is strategically located at a major global crossroads, through which
much of the world's commerce and natural resources flow (Kaplan 2010). The region, with a
population greater than the European Union, is also home to one of the world's largest
migration flows (Chouvy 2013). Most ASEAN states have porous borders, contributing to a
high incidence of illegal migration, including the smuggling and trafficking of drugs, guns,
and humans (Miani 2011; Mohamed et al. 2011; Feingold 2013). Since September 11, 2001,
Southeast Asia has experienced increasing and varied threats, from the Bali Bombings
conducted by the regional terrorist group Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), to the A.Q. Khan nuclear
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proliferation ring links in Malaysia and Singapore. A senior JI member, Ridwan Issamuddin,
better known as "Hambali," was arrested in Bangkok, Thailand, where the Bali Bombers had
conducted their planning (Liow, 2011, 1416).4 Southeast Asia is also widely known for
human trafficking, illicit sex trade, and endemic corruption.
Southeast Asia contains porous borders and diverse multicultural and multilingual
populations. This combination benefits terrorist organizations as well as human traffickers.
Many of the 620 million people living in Southeast Asia face additional vulnerabilities,
including stark poverty, unequal and often unavailable healthcare and education, and
multiple ethnic groups who are treated as stateless, especially in the border areas of
peninsular Southeast Asia (Brooks 2014). This confluence of risk factors has gained the
attention of individual governments, and of ASEAN. One mechanism for addressing these
risk factors, while simultaneously passing along the benefits of economic progress and
political consolidation, is through ASEAN human rights initiatives.
President Obama recently declared his intent to pivot U.S. foreign policy focus
towards Asia, and his administration has sought to emphasize the strategic and economic
importance of the region (Clinton 2011; Manyin et al. 2012). The administration has defined
this rebalance largely on projections of economic opportunity, but China's rise has
dominated discussions of the policy. In both cases, U.S. policy describes a stronger ASEAN
as an important element of stability and prosperous economic ties.
A great deal of economic and diplomatic attention, in addition to security assistance,
has been directed towards Southeast and East Asia, a region with many dynamic and growing
JI represents both a domestic and a regional terrorism threat; Malaysia's A.Q. Khan link represents regional
and global proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the threat posed by transnational organized
criminal (TOC) groups; Hambali represents the global terror threat, as he was a key link between al Qaeda and
regional terror groups. Terrorism and TOC is beyond the scope of this paper, but the importance of these factors
cannot be overstated when considering the importance and effectiveness of ASEAN as a regional organization.
4
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economies as well as globally strategic shipping lanes, such as the Malacca Straits, through
which 92% of Japan's oil transits from the Middle East (Cattaneo 2013). The Asia-Pacific
region includes the world's four most populous countries, four of the largest economies, and
six nuclear-armed states. The region also includes five of seven U.S. treaty allies, 5 including
Thailand and the Philippines in Southeast Asia, a sub-region that has recently received
increasing security assistance from the United States (Locklear 2014). Central to this
rebalancing is U.S. efforts to influence the norms and rules that are vital to improving
economic and diplomatic ties throughout the region, as well as to encourage robust regional
and international cooperation as China continues to rise (Manyin et al., 2012).
In this chapter I will study what type of human rights regime is emerging in Southeast
Asia, and analyze the forces shaping that regime. The AHRD is a significant development in
the evolution of a human rights regime in Southeast Asia, and the process that brought this
document to an official policy level provides some insight into what challenges and
opportunities exist in combatting human trafficking within the security and human rights
context. This study fills a gap in the literature, as no research has yet applied Young's model
of regime dynamics to ASEAN, and little research has studied ASEAN and its passage of the
ASEAN Human Rights Declaration.
Methodology
Young identifies three developmental sequences for regimes as they respond to
collective problems, such as security threats or social upheavals (1982, 281-284). These
regimes can be classified by type as spontaneous orders, negotiated orders, and imposed
orders. Young describes the pressures that precede these changes in a regional or
5 The United States has seven active mutual defense treaty alliances: NATO (28 states), the Rio Treaty (18
states), ANWS (Australia and New Zealand, although New Zealand withdrew in 1985), and four bilateral
treaties, with Thailand, the Philippines, Japan, and South Korea.
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international regime as "internal contradictions, shifts in underlying power structures, and
exogenous forces (1982, 297)." Another way oflabeling these regime forces would be
internal hegemonic power, external pressure, shared internal values, and domestic pressure.
The first two are generally viewed as types of imposed order, while the second two are
negotiated factors.

Figure 3.1. Three Developmental Sequences for International Regimes

"I;

,r·d

. •I·

jf

t,

il;

j. r

-

- -

- -

- -

" Natural markets"

Do not require
explicit consent

Do not involve
conscious
coordination

Convergence of
expectations
around prominent
or salient outcomes

Adapted from Young, Oran R. 1982. Regime Dynamics: The Rise and Fall of
International Ree:imes. International Ornanization 36(2): 277-297

Young emphasizes that these types of regime order are not mutually exclusive and
any attempt to classify regimes rigidly will distort their reality and lead to confusion, rather
than greater understanding (1982, 286).
Ciorciari (2012) identifies three similar mechanisms for policy change: First,
established regional human rights regimes can become enforcers and "norm incubators
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(2012, 714)," but in the case of ASEAN, the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on
Human Rights (AICHR) Terms of Reference deliberately preclude this possibility. Second,
Ciorciari describes "lateral pressure (2012, 716)," through which member states can exert
both normative and structural pressure to influence change. This lateral pressure might be
negotiated or imposed; in the example of ASEAN, it is negotiated, deliberative, and even
tentative, due to the formal tradition of non-interference in the domestic affairs of other
states. Finally is the bottom-up pressure, or negotiated regime, that civil society can bring to
bear on the government, potentially changing the government's cost-benefit calculations
(2012, 718). Civil society pressures also have characteristics of spontaneous order, but this
implies change coming about naturally, with minimal or no "conscious coordination among
participants (Young 1982, 282)." This is not the case in the context of human rights in the
ASEAN region; there is not yet evidence of spontaneous regional human rights regimes
emerging, although one might argue that human rights norms are emerging spontaneously
within certain sub-regional contexts.
From this framework, I will conduct content analysis of ASEAN official documents
and available media reports regarding the deliberation and adoption of the AHRD to answer
the following questions; what led to the passage of the 2012 AHRD? What interest groups or
stake holders supported adoption of the AHRD? What groups opposed it? I will test the
following hypotheses using Young's typology, through the application of three hypotheses.

Hypothesis 1 (Hl)- (negotiated orders- domestic pressure) If a distinguishing feature of
an international regime is the "conjunction of convergent expectations and recognized
patterns of behavior or practice (Young 1982, 278)," then we can expect to see both:
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convergent expectations regarding human rights, as well as changes in patterns of
behavior or practice, within state institutions and civil society organizations.
To test this hypothesis I analyze the establishment and development of national
human rights institutions within ASEAN, to gain a better understanding of the role individual
states have played in the development of a regional human rights regime. I then analyze
available documents published by the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human
Rights, as well as studying civil society organizations and NGOs in their responses and
recommendations to the AICHR and ASEAN regarding human rights and development of the
ASEAN Human Rights Declaration.

Hypothesis 2 (H2)- (imposed orders) If Indonesia retains an authoritarian political
culture, then it will impose hegemonic power within ASEAN.
In order to measure whether Indonesia imposed its will in the drafting and passage of
the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration, as opposed to negotiating its will, we must have
some idea of what that will was. Indonesia was chosen for examination because of its size
and prominence within ASEAN, as well as its history of authoritarian rule and hegemonic
behavior in Southeast Asia.
Indonesia currently has a population of 23 7 million people and contains nearly forty
percent of the entire ASEAN population. Indonesia is the third largest democracy in the
world as well as the largest Muslim-majority country. The Indonesian economy has grown
rapidly in the wake of the 1997-1999 financial crisis, and most major economic powers today
seek to establish greater economic and diplomatic ties with this rising power (Buehler 2012;
Bush III et al 2013). These disproportionate strengths, vis a vis its Southeast Asian
neighbors, support my hypothesis that Indonesia will seek to exert this disproportionate
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influence in ASEAN. Indonesia also has a long history of authoritarian rule, to include
aggressive regional hegemonic behavior, to further support my hypothesis that Indonesia will
exert hegemonic power within ASEAN.
Indonesia gained independence in 1949 through war with the Dutch, and remained
hegemonic and authoritarian for much of its history. This stands in sharp contrast to many of
its neighbors, who gained their national independence through negotiation and collaboration,
following the Second World War (Drakeley 2005). One reason for its authoritarian history
has been the ongoing struggle for political consolidation (Stratfor 2012). Indonesia faces
many national security challenges, both internal and external; such security instability has
been identified as having a negative effect on human rights voting (Forsythe 1979).
Indonesia's approach to the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration can be viewed within the
historic context of strong tendencies towards authoritarian power structures.
Indonesia does not have a high level of transparency, but there are indications of what
the government sought in the AHRD. By reviewing official government statements, reports
by civil society groups and observers, and the final language of the AHRD, this study will
provide a deeper assessment oflndonesia's balance between authoritarian and pluralist rule
inASEAN.
Young defines imposed orders as "deliberately established by dominant actors who
succeed in getting others to conform to the requirements of these orders through some
combination of coercion, cooptation, and the manipulation of incentives (Young 1982, 284)."
For this hypothesis to prove true, I expect Indonesia to impose its intent upon ASEAN, while
guarding against external hegemonic pressure, such as that measured in hypothesis three.
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To test hypothesis two, I analyze official documents and media reporting from 20112012, the two years prior to the November 18, 2012 signing of the ASEAN Human Rights
Declaration. I focus my analysis at several different levels, including senior Indonesian
officials, NGO reports, and media reporting on the development of the AHRD. One
limitation of this research is the lack of transparency within the inner workings of ASEAN
and the ten member states. This opacity emerges as one of the central criticisms of ASEAN
and development of the AHRD.
I analyze the role of senior military officials in the government of Indonesia, as well
as reports of human rights abuses by the Indonesian Army, which is an essential context for
understanding Indonesian policy formation regarding human rights legislation. I then conduct
a brief review oflndonesia's post-independence history, to provide a further contextual
baseline for comparing recent applications oflndonesia's regional power. Finally, I analyze
several key Indonesian leaders, including the current president and several key leaders from
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the department lead for the ASEAN Intergovernmental
Commission on Human Rights (AICHR). The AICHR was the commission tasked with
drafting the AHRD.

Hypothesis 3 (H3)- (imposed orders) Major powers will exert pressure on ASEAN in an
attempt to shape the content of the AHRD. Specifically, the United States will seek to
influence ASEAN to develop robust human rights commitments. Conversely, I
anticipate China will also exert hegemonic pressure towards ASEAN, although with the
intent to maintain the status quo.
Young maintains that orders can be imposed by external hegemonic powers that
institute leadership and the manipulation of incentives to promote terms they deem favorable
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(1982, 285). Major powers will exert pressure on ASEAN in an attempt to shape the content
of the AHRD. Specifically, the United States will seek to influence ASEAN to develop
robust human rights commitments. Conversely, I anticipate China will also exert hegemonic
pressure towards ASEAN, although with the intent to maintain the status quo. The Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) has historically emphasized non-interference in domestic affairs of
other states, and utilization of bilateral negotiations versus negotiating with ASEAN as a
regional block. I do not anticipate significant change in the CCP position regarding the
AHRD specifically, or towards ASEAN more broadly.
To test hypothesis three I examine several key U.S. national policy documents, then
study statements made by key federal executive branch leaders, to include President Obama
and then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. I analyze their travel and engagement with
regional forums in Southeast Asia, as well as public statements they made regarding human
rights or human trafficking. Finally, I briefly analyze China's role as an external hegemon,
and their role in seeking to influence development of a human rights regional regime in
Southeast Asia.

Summary Findings
Hypothesis 1
Hl- (negotiated orders) If a distinguishing feature of an international regime is the
"conjunction of convergent expectations and recognized patterns of behavior or
practice (Young 1982, 278)," then we can expect to see both: convergent expectations
regarding human rights, as well as changes in patterns of behavior or practice, within
state institutions and civil society organizations.
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Therefore, if the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration is evidence of an emerging
regional regime, then I expect to see evidence that ASEAN states have convergent
expectations of elevating human rights concerns, as opposed to primarily using the language
of liberal human rights regimes, with no (or little) intention of institutionalizing human rights
laws or norms. I also anticipate seeing evidence of growing expectations across a broader
swath of ASEAN societies, as opposed to being limited to human rights activists and foreign
diplomats.
ASEAN has generated a great deal of human rights documents (see Table 3.1. below),
and most have been published in the past decade, indicating increased attention to human
rights issues. While these documents indicate a change in patterns and practices within
ASEAN governmental communities, these documents do not invariably indicate strongly
convergent expectations regarding human rights.

Table 3.1. ASEAN Human Rights Legislation (and other relevant documents)
2013

Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women and Elimination of
Violence Against Children in ASEAN

2013

ASEAN Declaration on Strengthening Social Protection

2012

ASEAN Human Rights Declaration (AHRD) (November 18, 2012)

2012

Guidelines on the Operations of AICHR (March 12, 2012)

2010

ASEAN Commission on the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Women
and Children (ACWC)

2010

ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR)

2009

Terms of Reference (TOR) of AICHR (endorsed by ASEAN Foreign Ministers)

2007

ASEAN Charter

2004

ASEAN Declaration Against Trafficking in Persons Particularly Women and
Children
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2004

Vientiane Action Programme (ASEAN member states commit to developing an
ASEAN instrument on the protection and promotion of the rights of migrant workers)
- (Replaces 1998 Hanoi Plan ofAction)

1999

Bangkok Declaration on Irregular Migration (ASEAN plus regional states)

1998

Hanoi Plan of Action (ASEAN plan addressing unequal economic development and to
strengthen collaboration in combatting trafficking in women and children)

1997

ASEAN Declaration on Transnational Crime (combat illegal immigration and
trafficking in persons)

1995

Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone

1993

Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action (at the United Nations World
Conference on Human Rights) (VDPA) (discussion ofAICHR creation began here)

1989

Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) (UN)

1988

Declaration of the Advancement of Women in the ASEAN Region

1984 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment (UN)
1976

Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia
- 1987 Protocol (amended): open accession to states outside SEA
- 1998 amended: condition accession on consent of all member states

1971

Declaration on the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN)

1967

Bangkok Declaration (Creation ofASEAN)

Source: All information collected by author from official ASEAN and UN web pages. Italicized
comments condensed from official descriptions. For further information see http://www.asean.org/
and http://humanrightsinasean.info/asean-timeline an online platform funded by USAID, the ABA
Rule of Law Initiative, and FORUM-ASIA.

National human rights institutions are an indication of regime development at the
state level (Renshaw 2012). We might expect these institutions to be established at the state
level before regional regimes emerge, and yet only five of the ten ASEAN member states
have a national human rights institution (see Table 3.2, below). Only three of these states
have a national human rights institution with legitimate independence (Mohamad 2002;
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Southwick 2012), namely Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines; even these provide
minimal documentation of the internal processes of the ASEAN Intergovernmental
Commission on Human Rights (AICHR). Two states, Myanmar and Malaysia, have national
human rights institutions, but neither of these institutions has gained independence to
function free of direct political interference. Myanmar and Malaysia have had distinctly
different political systems since WWII, yet each maintained a one-party rule for most of that
time.
Myanmar was once a regional economic and political powerhouse, but its prominence
and prosperity diminished throughout the twentieth century. From 1962 until 2011, Myanmar
was under near-totalitarian military rule. Since 1962, the year democracy ended in Myanmar,
the Burmese constitution has contained severe restrictions on non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) and civil society, resulting in the atrophy of civil institutions (Clapp
2007; 22-27; Turnell 2008, 3). Myanmar established the Myanmar Human Rights
Commission in 2011, but has secured in law neither its independence, nor federal funding, as
of2013. The commission was established by Thein Sein, the retired Army General and
transformational president of Myanmar, but lasting change will take time, as Myanmar has
little existing capacity or capability to build effective civil society institutions, after decades
of neglecting official institutions, and suppression of traditional ones (McCarthy 2012).
Myanmar has been governed almost exclusively by the military since 1962 (Gstergaard 2008;
International Crisis Group 2009, 3).
Malaysia also has a national human rights commission, Suruhanjaya Hak Asasi
Malaysia (SUHAKAM), dating back to 1999, but the commission is strictly advisory, highly
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formal, and remains tied to the ruling political coalition through its politicized member
nomination process (Mohamad 2002; SUHAKAM 2012).
The remaining half of ASEAN states, namely Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Laos,
Singapore, and Vietnam, do not have any form of a national human rights commission. These
examples illustrate the relative immaturity of human rights institutions in Southeast Asia.
Hence, the creation of the ASIAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights was
viewed as a step forward.

Table 3.2 National Human Rights Institutions in ASEAN states
Date
Date
Created
active
Philippines
1987
same
Indonesia
1993
same

Commission on Human Rights
National Commission on Human Rights (Komnas
HAM)

Thailand
Malaysia

1997
1999

2001
2000

Myanmar

2011

Limited 1

National Human Rights Commission
Human Rights Commission of Malaysia
(SUHAKAM)
Myanmar National Human Rights Commission
(MNHRC)

Source: Data compiled by author
1. The MNHRC does not yet have a constitutional mandate, nor a dedicated federal
budget (as of December 2013).
The ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) was created
in 2009 as a "consultative inter-governmental body (ASEAN 2009, 6; Renshaw 2012),"
resulting in restricted access for civil society groups, and limited power for the body to act
decisively. This symbiosis with government contributes to the widespread criticisms of
human rights initiatives in Southeast Asia for their rhetoric and lack of transparency
(Ramcharan 2010, 204; Terada 2011 ). The AICHR has been widely criticized by regional
civil society organizations for lacking transparency and failing to consult with civil society
organizations (Asian Tribune 2012).
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The ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights was further criticized
by the Solidarity for Asian People's Advocacy Task Force on ASEAN and Human Rights
(SAPA TFAHR), who publishes an annual performance report on the AICHR. Their 2012
report focused heavily on the failure of the AICHR to consult with key stakeholders,
especially civil society organizations and ASEAN's own national human rights institutions.
This report repeatedly criticized the commission's secrecy and the institutionalized ASEAN
Way of decision making by consensus (Sigiro et al. 2012; 35), noting that this policy
requiring consensus provides the most conservative members veto power over any
recommendations. The 2012 SAPA TF AHR report includes 20 annexes, 17 of which are
reprinted reports of various international NGOs and regional civil society organizations;
eight of these submissions are specific recommendations to the AICHR regarding the
ASEAN Human Rights Declaration. These reports illustrate the diversity and expertise of
interest groups throughout the region regarding establishment of a functioning ASEAN
human rights regime, and their dedication to participating in the process.
Demonstrating further NGO and civil society organization coalescence around this
issue, a coalition of 55 civil society organizations submitted a joint press statement with
scathing criticism of the AHRD, one day after the signing of the ASEAN Human Rights
Declaration. The letter cataloged a series of concerns and flatly rejected the declaration,
describing it as deeply flawed, and alleging that the AHRD actually undermines extant
international human rights laws and commitments that ASEAN member states had
previously signed. The statement went on to reiterate to ASEAN member states that
international law supersedes the regional declaration, especially its caveats and
equivocations, again requesting that the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human
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Rights engage in meaningful and substantive dialog with civil society groups (ASEAN News
2012).
Based on the robust activity recorded by dozens of regional civil society
organizations, this study finds strong support for the hypothesis that convergent expectations
will be evident if a human rights regime is truly emerging. Within civil society, broad
patterns of behavior and practice are also evident, especially coalescing around the 2009
creation of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights, and the process of
drafting and signing the 2012 ASEAN Human Rights Declaration. On the other hand, these
same groups express concern that an authentic regime is not yet established at the state and
regional level, and may in fact be weakening due to the lack of transparency within ASEAN
institutions.
Overall, I find strong support for hypothesis one; ASEAN does have a developing
human rights regime, despite real concerns and slow progress. The rapidly increasing
pressure from civil society is evidence that norms and expectations are being established,
which will be difficult for leaders in the region to step away from (Ciorciari 2012). Renshaw
(2012) analyzed the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights Terms of
Reference, as well as the role of national human rights institutions and civil society
organizations, and found symbiotic relationships developing between these organizations.
She identifies these as powerful normative factors, particularly citing the improved
effectiveness of civil society organizations engaging international regimes to exert the
pressure they do not yet have authorized mechanisms in place to do so themselves. She does
conclude with one cautionary reminder; some states will be less responsive to these
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pressures, and international influence must compete with domestic political imperatives
(Renshaw 2012, 313).
Hypothesis 2
H2- (imposed orders) If Indonesia retains an authoritarian political culture, then it will
impose hegemonic power within ASEAN.
The military remains a major center of power in Indonesia, although since 1999 the
government has placed significant power into other institutions, such as the police in their
counterterrorism efforts, the 2001 constitutional court, and the 2002 Corruption Eradication
Commission (Bush III et al 2013, 12). The judiciary has frequently ruled against the
government, and yet frequent reports of corruption in the courts persist (Buehler 2012).
Military officers have historically been a vital part of the government. Although the army lost
their parliamentary seats in 2004, President Yudhoyono appointed his brother-in-law,
General Pramono Eddhie Wibowo, as Army Chief of Staff, an indicator of continued
cronyism and residual military influence over the government. Media reports anticipated that
Yudhoyono's brother-in-law was being groomed to run for president for the 2014 elections
(Parlina 2011).
As predicted, Wibowo was one of the three leading candidates for president in 2014,
despite accusations of nepotism and his association with gross human rights abuses when he
was the commander ofKOPASSUS (Komando Pasuk:an Khusus), Indonesia's Army Special
Forces, during 1999 operations in East Timor. Army generals are common in Indonesian
national politics, especially those who have served in KOPASSUS. The 2014 parliamentary
and presidential elections had two prominent candidates, Wibowo and Prabowo Subianto,
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both of whom commanded Kopassus units. Both men have been implicated with gross
human rights abuses during their respective time in KOPASSUS (ETAN 2014; Fionna 2014).
Military men continue to exert power and influence within Indonesia, partly due to
how young the nation's democratic institutions are, but also due to its long history of military
dominance of national governance. Hence, the overarching priority for the United States
Mission in Jakarta is support to democratic institutions.
U.S. Army Special Forces have not trained with KOPASSUS since 1998, due to
allegations of gross human rights violations by KOPAS SUS. These restrictions result from
the Leahy Amendments, dating back to 1997 and P.Law 104-208. The Leahy Amendments to
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and the National Defense Appropriations Act have since
been passed as law, and continue to be used globally. This level of U.S. diplomatic influence
and legal constraint illustrates the high level of perceived authoritarian impunity in
Indonesia; many analysts believe Senator Leahy sponsored these amendments primarily due
to atrocities reported in Indonesia (Comer 2010, 58-59).
Corruption and political abuse of power remains widespread in Indonesia. During a
panel discussion at Brookings Institute in February 2013, Vanda Felbab-Brown observed that
Indonesia had achieved a remarkable level of transparency regarding freedom of expression
and the media, but concern that accountability had not yet followed. She stated, "The
problem is now we have finally gotten transparency... during the Soeharto era you had
transparency with opaqueness. These days you have impunity with transparency. There are
exposures, but very little happens after the exposure takes place" (Bush III et al 2013, 26).
When senior military and political leaders are accused of corruption, yet retain impunity from
the judicial process, implications of authoritarian rule gain weight. This poorly restrained
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power creates an environment that is highly conducive to hegemonic tendencies (Honna
2012; Mietzner 2013).
Young argues that imposed orders can be differentiated in two types; overt hegemony
and de facto imposition (1982, 284. See also Figure 3.1). Indonesia exercised overt
hegemonic dominance both domestically and regionally during the first decades of its
independence. Under President Sukarno (1949-1966), Indonesia used military force and
threat of force to impose its will on neighboring countries, to include armed conflicts such as
Konfrontasi, the 1963-66 war waged against Malaysia (Drakeley 2005). Under President
Suharto (1967-1998), this overt hegemony was predominantly focused internally, through
brutal suppression of communism, dissent, and autonomy (ibid). The military took control of
government in 1966, and conducted a purge of communists that cost more than 500,000 lives
(Mietzner 2013). Indonesia experienced a tumultuous transition to pluralist democracy in
1999, and has since exhibited far more de facto hegemony, in combination with artfully
negotiated order.
Nevertheless, since 2004, Indonesia's presidency has been held by another retired
Army General, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. Yudhoyono has significantly decentralized
power to outlying regions, and critics note that power has not yet flowed to the people
(Stratfor 2012). The army retains its geographic command structure, which empowers
regional commanders even more in this decentralized system. Corruption remains a major
problem (Liddle and Mujani 2009; Buehler 2012). Nevertheless, residual military influence
in government and persistent corruption are not sufficient evidence to support the hypothesis
that Indonesia will exert hegemonic power within ASEAN.
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The ASEAN host country and chairmanship is rotated annually. Indonesia held the
chair in 2011, followed by Cambodia in 2012, the two years the ASEAN Human Rights
Declaration was being drafted. This case study provides a superb opportunity to assess what
type of regime dynamics Indonesia displays. As the largest member in ASEAN, by
geographic size, population, and GDP, I expect Indonesia to impose its will over ASEAN's
smaller countries, especially Cambodia, which was the last country to join ASEAN, and one
of the smallest and poorest in the Association.
Ngurah Swajaya served as the Indonesian Ambassador to ASEAN from 2010-2013,
and therefore served as Chairperson of the Committee of the Permanent Representative to
ASEAN in 2011. Ngurah emphasized both security and economic priorities as the ASEAN
chairman, but also placed human rights amongst his top priorities for ASEAN. Specifically,
Ngurah discussed the importance of sea connectivity, a code of conduct for the South China
Sea, free movement of skilled and unskilled labor, protection of migrant workers, and better
application of human rights principles (BBC 2011).
Ngurah also questioned whether other ASEAN countries were willing to support
Indonesia on these key global issues. Ngurah had demonstrated extensive experience in the
more nuanced diplomatic arts of persuasion, having been the Indonesian Ambassador to
Germany (1991-1995) and the UN (1999-2003). He later served as the Director for ASEAN
Political Security Cooperation until 2009, indicating a solid grasp of regional security
challenges as well as broader human rights principles. This was a powerful position, as the
2007 ASEAN Charter institutionalized ASEAN's Vision 2020, with the intent of establishing
a regional, rules-based institution. This ASEAN union is intended to be built upon three pillar
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communities: ASEAN Political-Security Community, the ASEAN Economic Community,
and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community.
This ASEAN Political-Security Community, which Ngurah directed for several years,
contains some of the most powerful and influential institutions within ASEAN, such as the
ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights, the ASEAN Regional Forum
(ARF), and the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting (ADMM), which now includes the
ADMM Plus, the 2010 inclusion of eight Asian powers (Australia, China, India, Japan, South
Korea, New Zealand, Russia, and the United States). Ngurah provided Indonesia a key
mechanism for influencing the most powerful institutions within ASEAN. Unfortunately,
ASEAN remains opaque in its inner functioning, rendering an in-depth assessment of his
methods of influence upon these institutions nearly impossible.
Following Indonesia, Cambodia was the 2012 ASEAN chair and host, the year the
AHRD was on the agenda for drafting and potential passage. One of the most notable
ASEAN events of the year was the fact that the A SEAN foreign ministers failed to issue a
joint communique for the first time in its 45-year history (Bower 2012). This event will be
discussed further below, 6 but created a strategic space for Indonesian diplomacy. Deutsche
Welle Asia (2012) observed that Marty Natalegawa, Indonesia's Foreign Minister, was able

to successfully draft an ASEAN statement within days of the failed ministers meeting,
providing some restored claim to legitimacy for the organization and demonstrating the
exceptional influence of Indonesia's diplomacy (Kek 2012).
Since transitioning to a more pluralist democracy in 1999, Indonesia has begun to
restrain its military, at least when compared to the decades of Sukarno and Suharto.
Indonesia has also demonstrated skillful diplomacy within the ASEAN framework. These
6

See Hypothesis 3 for further discussion.
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examples, while limited in scope and depth, indicate a transition from hegemonic to defacto
imposition of its will. Several senior Indonesian leaders, such as Marty Natalegawa and
Ngurah Swajaya, have demonstrated skillful legislative bargaining, indicating some
movement from Young's imposed orders to negotiated orders (see Figure 3.1).
Yudhoyono, Ngurah, and Natalegawa have all demonstrated negotiation skills in
brokering regional policy (Mietzner 2012, 124; Thayer 2012; Moffet 2013). While
Indonesian democracy is young, and likely to suffer setbacks, this study finds Indonesia
exerting more negotiation skills than anticipated. Likewise, this study finds little support for
the hypothesis that Indonesia would exert overt hegemony in ASEAN to impose its will. My
research did not find sufficient data to analyze the internal negotiations of the ASEAN
Human Rights Declaration, and therefore this assessment must be qualified as tentative,
pending greater transparency within ASEAN governance.

Hypothesis 3
H3- (imposed orders) Major powers will exert pressure on ASEAN in an attempt to
shape the content of the AHRD. Specifically, the United States will seek to influence
ASEAN to develop robust human rights commitments. Conversely, I anticipate China
will also exert hegemonic pressure towards ASEAN, although with the intent to
maintain the status quo.
The world has been described as unipolar in the post-Cold War era, with the United
States as the only state capable of exerting hegemonic influence globally (Schweller and Pu
2011; Monteiro 2011). The United States may no longer be the sole global power, but is
likely to remain the dominant global hegemon for decades (Nye 2013). The Obama
Administration has dedicated considerable diplomatic attention to the Asia Pacific region,
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and ASEAN has been a central element of that engagement (Obama 2010; Clinton 2011;
Avendasora 2012). With this hypothesis I anticipate the United States will demonstrate de
facto imposition of imposed orders in combination with powerful negotiation of these orders.
President Obama's 2010 National Security Strategy (Obama 2010) identifies ASEAN
amongst a select group of regional multilateral institutions vital to U.S. strategic interests.
The National Security Strategy also refers to the promotion of human rights more than thirty
times, listing human rights as a core national value that is essential for advancing the nation's
interests. This national security strategy, along with recent federal laws designed to protect
and promote human rights and counter human trafficking, combine to support this
hypothesis.
Hillary Clinton was the first senior U.S. Administration official to travel to all ten
ASEAN states, when she met with the Sultan and senior officials of Brunei Darussalam
(Avendasora 2013). Clinton had placed special emphasis on ASEAN before; in her 2011
essay in Foreign Policy magazine, she cited ASEAN and APEC as multilateral institutions
with which the United States is fully engaged (Clinton 2011). Clinton also acknowledged this
as a core policy of the president, observing that Obama would attend the East Asia Summit
(EAS) that same year. Clinton actively supported her ASEAN counterparts in promoting
ASEAN unity, primarily regarding China's hegemonic claims over the South China Sea
(Kaplan 2014, 16, 62). She did occasionally mention human rights as well, but in
comparatively general terms or in a bilateral context, specific to the country she was visiting
at the time.
Clinton demonstrated her commitment to supporting regional partners in her staunch
support of Marty Natalegawa, Indonesia's Foreign Minister. She stood beside him in press
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conferences declaring strong U.S. support for an ASEAN-China maritime code of conduct,
and reported that she had brought up human rights concerns in Indonesia, mentioning
persecution of religious minorities and suppression of separatists in Papua Province (AP
2012). In an apparent move to establish support for ASEAN, Clinton traveled first to Jakarta,
the capital of Indonesia and the location of ASEAN headquarters, prior to visiting Beijing in
2012. The British newspaper, The Telegraph (2012), also reported Secretary Clinton's visit
with Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, Marty Natalegawa, and the ASEAN
Secretary General, Surin Pitsuwan, to discuss ASEAN engagement with China. According to
The Telegraph, unnamed U.S. officials reported that Clinton had specifically discussed
human rights during these meetings. Nevertheless, her public statements remained focused
on regional security concerns, especially the escalating tensions in the South China Sea.
Obama did attend the 2011 and the 2012 East Asia Summits, which was an historic
first for a U.S. president to attend. Obama's participation in the EAS has been viewed as a
deliberate response to active Chinese diplomacy in regional institutions, and the perception
that China sought to marginalize or even exclude the U.S. in some venues. For instance, the
U.S. was denied observer status of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization's 2006 meeting
(Manyin et al. 2012). The 2011 summit was dominated by South China Sea security
concerns, specifically revolving around increasing tensions between China and several
ASEAN states, including Vietnam and the Philippines (Grammaticas 2011). Obama and his
team asserted U.S. commitment to regional and multilateral cooperation in dealing peacefully
with such divisive issues as sovereignty in the maritime realm. Obama effectively staked a
position for the United States as the de facto guarantor of maritime security. I assert that this
position represents a vital strategic interest to the United States vis-a-vis global shipping and
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global trade, but that Obama also used this summit as an opportunity to assert hegemonic
dominance regionally, thereby reassuring ASEAN and improving U.S. diplomatic
positioning for various other priority issues, to include human rights.
Obama used the 2012 EAS to again emphasize U.S. support for multilateralism as the
optimal venue for engagement across a variety of issues, again with emphasis on maritime
security. The Obama team engaged on multiple topics, with security as a common theme, to
include cooperation regarding energy, nonproliferation, and establishment of rules-based
institutions to protect universal human rights (U.S. White House 2012).
While there is little indication that senior administration officials directly exerted
public pressure over the AHRD, it appears clear that the intent was to impose order and
multilateralism, both being essential to facilitate U.S. emphasis on human rights broadly, and
the AHRD specifically. Executives are often most effective in clearly defining broad goals in
order to set the conditions for designated representatives to engage more effectively on
specific policy issues. Therefore, it is possible that U.S. leaders did exert some discrete
pressure on the AHRD process; this study did not find evidence, beyond general statements
on broader human rights principles.
Unfortunately, there is scant evidence of direct administration or State Department
involvement leading up to the AHRD, even at the Assistant Secretary level. The vast
majority of high-level engagement during the 2011-2012 period under study focused on
establishment of an ASEAN-China Code of Conduct regarding maritime norms and the
South China Sea. Future reports may indicate higher level interactions seeking to influence
this regional human rights regime, but this study finds that the majority of direct pressure
came from lower level diplomatic engagement and from NGOs. While I do find the
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overarching efforts to exert regional stability and security, along with significant efforts to
establish and support regional norms and institutions, this is not sufficient to support the
hypothesis. While U.S. rhetoric supporting human rights regimes is clearly documented, I
find little evidence of significant U.S. investment in the AHRD.

China
China has demonstrated high-level engagement with ASEAN, to include comments
on the AHRD. China is broadly viewed as the rising regional hegemonic power, and has
exerted its influence in apparently contradictory ways. One of the greatest quandaries for
ASEAN states is the opacity by which China conducts much of its development, military
spending and intentions, and its diplomacy (Allison and Blackwill 2013, 151).
As discussed in hypothesis two, the 2012 ASEAN Ministerial Meeting failed for the
first time in 45 years to issue a joint communique. This was viewed from within ASEAN as a
great embarrassment, and externally as another sign that ASEAN remained a talk shop of
elites, more than a representative regional democratic institution. The sticking point was
recent escalations in the South China Sea, specifically between China and the Philippines, at
Scarborough Shoals. The joint communique drafters were unable to agree on whether to
mention this confrontation, which had born the hallmarks of escalating to armed conflict for
several weeks (BBC 2012). Bower (2012) reported that multiple iterations of the draft were
proposed, and all were rejected by the Cambodian delegate, after external consultations.
These consultations were widely reported as having been heavily influenced by China.
Carl Thayer (2012), a scholar at the CSIS Asia House, expounded on the security
threat, which included China's Central Military Commission establishing a military garrison
headquarters in the disputed islands of the South China Sea (Kaplan 2014, 128). This act
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exemplifies the regional tensions, leaving most of China's neighbors feeling pressed between
the Scylla and Charybdis of rapidly growing Chinese economic heft and surging military
confidence.
In summary, there is evidence of China exerting overt hegemony as well as de facto
imposition of its will, in order to maintain the status quo of China's preference for bilateral
negotiations, held privately. On the other hand, this study finds surprisingly little evidence of
direct U.S. influence over the drafting of the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration.
Summary and Conclusion
The ASEAN Human Rights Declaration declares rights that are contradictory to
traditional "Asian values," creating political dissonance between traditional power structures
and civil society. The AHRD further formalizes these social institutions within the rulesbased regional and national governments. This codification of values and ideals into law
creates commitments that will be increasingly difficult for national leaders to step away from,
or to justify authoritarian and repressive policies under the rubric of stability or social
harmony.
This chapter finds that the AHRD does indeed contain political rhetoric, but also
indicates legislative progress towards providing real protection for human rights in Southeast
Asia. The hypotheses examined revealed mixed results. I found strong support for hypothesis
one, enough support to tentatively reject hypothesis two, and mixed results with hypothesis
three.
Overall, I find strong support for hypothesis one; ASEAN does have a developing
human rights regime, despite real concerns and slow progress. The rapidly increasing
pressure from civil society is evidence that norms and expectations are being established
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across broad sectors of society throughout ASEAN. Social discourse remains divisive
regarding human rights, especially where strong Islamic, Communist, and authoritarian
governments remain. Nevertheless, even in ASEAN states as diverse as Indonesia,
Philippines, and Vietnam, civil society organizations are gaining a stronger voice, especially
regarding human rights. Human rights institutions are growing, both within government and
throughout society, creating norms that will be difficult for national and regional leaders to
back away from, as both Ciorciari (2012) and Renshaw (2012) anticipated.
Hypothesis two, on the other hand, I have rejected, based on extrapolation of
available data. As identified above, the inner deliberations of ASEAN remain opaque and
closed to public observation; But, based on available public records and reporting,
Indonesia's role in the drafting and passage of the AHRD was not overtly hegemonic, and
indicates more negotiation and bargaining than even de facto imposition of hegemonic
influence.
Finally, the third hypothesis resulted in mixed results. As anticipated, I found
evidence of China exerting significant hegemonic influence over ASEAN proceedings during
the period of time analyzed. On the other hand, I did not find evidence of significant U.S.
exertion of either negotiated nor imposed hegemonic influence over the AHRD. In the
narrow perspective of the AHRD, this hypothesis is rejected. Yet, in the broader context of
human rights, chapter four will indicate that the U.S. has exerted significant pressure over
human rights in Asia. My conclusion regarding 2011-2012 is that the AHRD took a back seat
to security concerns, as tensions rose significantly over conflicting territorial claims in the
South China Sea, amidst the largest and longest-sustained increases in defense spending
compared to any other region of the world (Perlo-Freeman and Solmirano 2014).
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The Asia-Pacific remains the only region globally with no regional human rights
commission or human rights court (Petersen 2011 ), giving the ASEAN Human Rights
Declaration the potential of setting precedence and becoming the model for a future AsiaPacific regional human rights institution. This late and limited development of even a subregional human rights institution illustrates how difficult the issue remains. Rhetoric will
likely predominate regional initiatives, and yet the AHRD indicates potential for reform.
Chapter four will examine one of the specific coercive instruments being used to influence
reform in approaches to combatting human trafficking.

Chapter 4:
Southeast Asia and Human Trafficking:
Comparing State Responses to the Trafficking in Persons Reports
Does democracy matter? The United States promotes democracy and democratic
institutions as an essential element of human rights, and directly ties these same concepts to
security. Promotion of democracy is infused throughout U.S. policy and rhetoric regarding
human rights and combatting human trafficking. This chapter seeks to better understand the
connection between democracy and human rights by analyzing several measures of both in
Southeast Asia.
As discussed previously, Southeast Asia is notorious for porous borders which allow
illicit groups cross-border mobility. This lack of effective border control contributes to a high
incidence of illegal migration, including the smuggling and trafficking of drugs, guns, and
humans (Hastings 2010; Miani 2011; Chouvy 2013; Feingold 2013). Since September 11,
2001, Southeast Asia has experienced increasing and varied threats, from the Bali Bombings
conducted by the Islamist terrorist organization, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), to the Malaysian
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links to the A.Q. Khan nuclear proliferation ring, a transnational organized crime (TOC)
group originating from Pakistan (Collins and Frantz 2010; Riedel 2013). A senior JI member,
Ridwan Issamuddin, better known as "Hambali," was arrested in Bangkok, Thailand, where
the Bali Bombers had conducted their planning (Liow, 2011, 1416). Hambali operated
throughout the region, from Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Cambodia, as well as three
years fighting in Afghanistan alongside Usama bin Laden and Khalid Sheik Muhammed; He
crossed borders and conducted operations regionally by utilizing a network of transnational
criminal organizations (Doyle and Ana 2003 ). Southeast Asia is also widely known for
human trafficking.
Higher defense spending has been positively correlated with corruption (Gupta, de
Mello, and Sharan (2001), and negatively correlated with human rights (Vadlamannati and
Pathmalal 2008). The U.S. government has identified terrorism, proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction (WMD), and corruption as threats to global security and prosperity, and has
cited democratic institutions and human rights as essential to improve global security and
prosperity (Obama 2010). The annual Department of State (DoS) Trafficking in Persons
Report (TIP) is one mechanism of national power that the United States uses to measure
human trafficking, and as a diplomatic and economic tool of coercion to influence policies of
other governments. In this chapter I compare several Southeast Asian states in their efforts to
counter human trafficking. These measures and their correlations are important to
understand, to maximize the effect and efficiency of efforts to combat trafficking, especially
in a time of budget cuts and resource constraints within the U.S. government.
In an effort to analyze how different government entities are responding to the
challenge of human trafficking, and what aspects of governance and diplomacy demonstrate
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effectiveness, I will seek to answer the following questions: Does the DoS TIP Report effect
change on other states? If so, in what ways are the reports most effective? In this chapter I
analyze selected data to test four hypotheses, to assess factors of corruption perceptions,
ratification rates of international human rights conventions, measures of democracy, and
defense spending. I utilize a variety of data, to include longitudinal quantitative data, which
serve as proxy measures of human rights and democratic values broadly within Southeast
Asia. While focusing predominantly on the governments of Indonesia, Thailand, and the
fl

Philippines, this chapter will look at various Southeast Asian states, to examine these
questions.
Methodology
I selected these three countries because they are all founding members of A SEAN,
and combined, account for nearly 70 percent of the ASEAN population; each has
demonstrated significant progress, and some regression, in combatting trafficking in the past
13 years (see Figure 4.4, below), which provides an opportunity to assess what factors
correlate with those changes; Thailand and the Philippines are two of only seven United
States' mutual defense treaty alliances; 7 all three have significant economic and strategic
value to U.S. interests; and finally, each has charted a unique path towards democracy, and
provide opportunities to compare and contrast different policies and political approaches to
the challenges of human trafficking.
Hypothesis 1 (Hl): States with lower levels of corruption will have improving
Trafficking in Persons (TIP) Tier ratings over time.

7 The United States has seven active mutual defense treaty alliances: NATO (28 states), the Rio Treaty (18
states), ANZUS (Australia and New Zealand, although New Zealand withdrew in 1985), and four bilateral
treaties, with Thailand, the Philippines, Japan, and South Korea.
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Corruption is highly correlated to human trafficking (Bales 2006). Transnational
terrorist networks as well as human traffickers require document forgers and corrupt officials
to facilitate illicit movement of people and materiel; such corrupt criminal activity is
corrosive to state and societal security (Keefer 2006). Corruption plays a crucial role in
facilitating human trafficking, and directly attacks the soul of society and democracy (Pratt
2004). I anticipate TIP Tier ratings to improve in states that receive lower corruption ratings,
as measured by Transparency Intemational's Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI).
To test this hypothesis, I compare the annual TIP Tier ratings of Indonesia, the
Philippines, and Thailand, against the Corruption Perceptions Index scores, from 2001 to
2013. I anticipate that these two variables will demonstrate a high level of correlation, but I
will specifically test the effect of TIP Tier ratings on corruption levels to measure the overall
hypothesis. The U.S. Department of State specifically uses the TIP report as a coercive and
normative diplomatic tool to influence the development of human rights regimes. Therefore,
the TIP reports should precipitate measureable changes in corruption levels, although
changes are likely to be more visible over decades rather than years. My data analysis covers
only 13 years, because 2001 was the first year TIP reports were published, pursuant to Public
Law (P.Law) 106-386, the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of2000.
Pratt (2004), Bales (2006), and Keefer (2006) have used the CPI ratings in their
research, suggesting that it is commonly used and accepted by scholars in the field. Wilhelm
(2002) tested the CPI for validity as a measure of public and corporate corruption, finding the
CPI highly correlated with other measures of corruption, and that the CPI had the strongest
correlation with GDP. Shao et al. (2007) also find a negative correlation between corruption
and economic factors; their study validates CPI as a useful measure for research.
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Transparency International, the NGO that publishes the CPI, measures corruption on
a scale of 1-100, focusing primarily on public sector corruption; then, each country is
assigned a global and a regional ranking. I use each individual country's CPI score, not their
global or regional rankings, because the scores provide better longitudinal comparison of
changing corruption levels within each specific country, independent of differences relative
to other countries.
The annual TIP Report assigns one of four ratings to each country evaluated. The
report is mandated by P.Law 106-386, the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of2000, which
has been reauthorized four times by the U.S. Congress, as the Trafficking Victims Protection
Reauthorization Act (TVPRA), in 2003, 2005, 2008, and 2013. These tiered ratings indicate a
state meets minimum specified TVPA standards; the U.S. Department of State specifies that
these ratings are not intended to compare one state to another (U.S. Department of State
2013, 410-411). I use these ratings as a metric to test my hypothesis, acknowledging the
limitations of the measure. See chapter two of this thesis for additional information on the
TVPRA, and for definitions of the TIP Tier rating system, see Appendix 1 at end of this
chapter.
Hypothesis 2 (H2): States with more robust human rights regimes will have higher
Trafficking in Persons (TIP) Tier ratings.
To test this hypothesis, I examined a list of 33 international human rights and
humanitarian law conventions. 8 I selected the conventions based on the list in the 2013 TIP
Report (2013, 405), and expanded on those international conventions by including relevant
conventions from Mohamad (2002) and Mohan (2011 ). I selected this type of data set based
on extensive scholarship that identifies East and Southeast Asian states as resistant to human
8

For entire list, see Appendix 4.2 at end of this chapter
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rights regimes due to concerns such as sovereignty, security, and differing cultural and
religious values systems (Poon 2001; Mohamad 2002; Chau 2008; Linton 2008, 482;
Jetschke 2011; Simon 2012; Mohamad 2012, 247). Additional scholarship identifies human
trafficking, transnational organized crime, and nuclear terror as threats to the Westphalian
construct of state sovereignty, and cite human rights as important macro considerations for
preserving state sovereignty and the international system (Baker 2007; Forsythe 2012, 21;
Scowcroft 2012). These tests for hypothesis two do more to address the robustness of human
rights regimes in Southeast Asian states, and provide some insight into how states respond to
human trafficking.
I initially took a simple average of how many of the selected conventions each
ASEAN country has ratified (see Table 4.1 ). The second column in table 4.1 lists the
percentage of the 33 selected human rights conventions each state has ratified, as of2012. To
further analyze the results, I broke the data out into five separate tables to analyze the data
from slightly modified perspectives. Below is an outline of the five tests, followed by a brief
description of each test.
- Test 1(Table4.2) compares democratic to non-democratic states in Southeast Asia.
- Test 2 (Table 4.3) eliminates two outlier states from test one, Singapore and Cambodia.
-Test 3 (Table 4.4) compares Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam (CLMV) to nonCLMV ASEAN states.
- Test 4 (Table 4.5) eliminates two outlier states from test three, Singapore and Cambodia.
- Test 5 (Table 4.6) compares wealthiest to poorest ASEAN states.
In test one, I separated the ten ASEAN states into two groups: democratic and nondemocratic, and then compared the averages of the five most democratic to the five least
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democratic states. Form of government is far more complex than this dichotomous grouping,
but this method provides a simple measure to establish a baseline test for the hypothesis.
Chapter three emphasized the diversity and complexity of political systems in A SEAN states,
so this categorization is blunt, but generally divides along the spectrum of representative
governments which hold public elections, to absolute monarchies and single party communist
governments. Despite the marked differences between these two groupings of states, test one
resulted in a mere four percent difference between how many human rights conventions had
been ratified by the selected democratic and non-democratic states. This led me to conduct
additional analysis.
It is worth noting that the five states designated as democratic for tests one and two

are also the five original ASEAN member countries, which established the association in
1967. I did not select these five states to represent the democratic unit of analysis based on
their founding membership in ASEAN; in that sense, the relationship is spurious. On the
other hand, the factors that influenced delayed entry into the association of the remaining five
states are likely among the same factors that delineated these as non-democratic.
In test two, I utilized the same groupings as test one, but eliminated two outlier states,
Singapore and Cambodia. I eliminated Singapore as an outlier due to its lowest ratification
ratio, which might indicate a highly repressive state. I would expect the lowest scoring states
to be in the company of non-democratic states that are routinely found in the bottom quartile
of global measures, such as North Korea, Sudan, or Papua New Guinea. This assumption
stands in stark contrast to Singapore's ranking in the top quartile of most international
ratings, ranging from socio-political ratings such as Freedom House's measures of political
freedom and civil liberties, and Transparency International' s Corruption Perceptions Index
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(see Chapter 3), to economic and development ratings, such as the World Bank's Ease of
Doing Business rankings and the World Economic Forum's Global Competitiveness Reports.
Singapore is often in the top 5-10 globally, placing it above other top quartile peers, such as
the United States, France, or Great Britain. By this and other measures of democracy,
Singapore is far more responsive to the needs of its people than are Myanmar, Vietnam, or
Laos.
I selected Cambodia for elimination as an outlier on the non-democratic side in test
two, despite its ranking as the second highest among ASEAN states for ratifying human
rights conventions and instruments, for many of the same reasons as Singapore; Cambodia
routinely ranks poorly on these same measures.

Table 4.1 Percentage of International Human Rights and Humanitarian
Law Conventions Ratified, ASEAN states*
Percentage
Country
ratified
Brunei
Cambodia
Indonesia
Laos
Malaysia
Myanmar
Philippines
Singapore
Thailand
Vietnam

30%
79%
55%
48%
33%
30%
82%
27%
52%
45%

*Percentage ofratifications, by country, of33 core international and United Nations
human rights and humanitarian law conventions and instruments, as of2012. See
Appendix 4.2 for complete list.
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Table 4.2 Test #1, Compare Ratification Rate of Human Rights
Conventions between 5 Nominally Democratic, 5 Non-democratic states
in Southeast Asia*
Percentage
Country
ratified
Philippines
82%
55%
Indonesia
nominally democratic
Thailand
52%
states average ratification
percentage: 50%
Malaysia
33%
Singapore
27%
Cambodia
79%
non-democratic
48%
Laos
states average ratification
Vietnam
45%
percentage: 46%
Brunei
30%
Difference: 4%
Myanmar
30%
*The countries identified as nominally democratic are also the original ASEAN
member states. This is a spurious relationship, and was not initially intended.
Identifying these states as "democratic" is problematic; these states are nominally
democratic, when compared to the remaining five states.

Table 4.3 Test #2: Compare Ratification Rate of Human Rights
Conventions between Nominally Democratic and Non-democratic
ASEAN states; eliminates the outliers from test #1, Cambodia and
s·me:apore
Percentage
Country
ratified
Philippines
82%
Indonesia
55%
nominally democratic
Thailand
52%
states average ratification
percentage: 56%
Malaysia
33%
SiagapeFe
~
Gamaeaia
~
non-democratic
Laos
48%
states average ratification
Vietnam
45%
percentage: 38%
Brunei
30%
Difference: 18%
Myanmar
30%
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Table 4.4 Test #3: Compare Ratification Rate of Human Rights
Conventions between Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam
(CLMV) vs non-CLMV states in Southeast Asia
Country
Philippines
Indonesia
Thailand
Malaysia
Brunei
Singapore
Cambodia
Laos
Vietnam
Myanmar

Percentage
ratified
82%
55%
52%
33%
30%
27%
79%
48%
45%
30%

ratification percentage of nonCLMV states: 47%

ratification percentage of
CLMV states: 51%

Difference: - 4%

Table 4.5 Test #4: Compare Ratification Rate of Human Rights
Conventions between Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam
(CLMV) vs non-CLMV states in Southeast Asia, eliminate outliers
(Cambodia/Singapore) from test #3
Percentage
Country
ratified
Philippines
82%
Indonesia
55%
Thailand
52%
ratification percentage of nonCLMV* states: 51 %
Malaysia
33%
Brunei
30%
Singapere
'.2-1%
Gamaedia
+9%
ratification percentage of
Laos
48%
CLMV** states: 41%
Vietnam
45%
Difference: 10%
Myanmar
30%
* eliminate Singapore from non-CLMV
**eliminate Cambodia from CLMV
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Table 4.6 Test #5: Compare Ratification Rate of Human Rights
Conventions between Wealthiest vs Poorest ASEAN states, 2012 IMF
GDP estimates*
Percentage
Country
ratified
1. Singapore
27%
30%
2. Brunei
wealthiest states: 39%
3. Malaysia
33%
52%
4. Thailand
55%
5. Indonesia
82%
6. Philippines
7. Vietnam
45%
poorest states: 57%
48%
8. Laos
9. Cambodia
79%
Difference:-18o/o**
10. Myanmar
30%
*Wealthiest and poorest ASEAN states, per IMF 2012 estimates of GDP per capita
**Negative correlation between per capita GDP and percentage of human rights
conventions ratified.

In test three, I separated ASEAN states as CLMV and non-CLMV, an informal but
common grouping amongst economic and development analysts who study Southeast Asia.
The CLMV states are Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam, which are also the four
poorest and least developed countries (see Table 4.6). Similar to test one, test three resulted
in only 4 percent difference, and surprisingly a negative correlation, so for test four, I
eliminated the same outlier states, Singapore and Cambodia. For test five, the final test for
hypothesis two, I divided the five wealthiest from the five poorest ASEAN states, based on
the International Monetary Fund's 2012 per capita GDP estimates (World Bank 2014).
I limited my analysis to the ten ASEAN states to maintain a tight focus on Southeast
Asia. Future analysis will benefit from broader comparison with other sub-regions.
Additionally, both variables, TIP Tier ratings and percentage of international human rights
conventions ratified, are broad categories. Rates of ratification are themselves complex, and

81

TIP Tier ratings are not designed for comparison between countries. Nevertheless, both
variables are important factors, and are useful in the broader context of analysis.
Hypothesis 3 (H3): Countries that are more democratic will have better human rights
records and/or institutions.
I anticipate finding higher TIP Tier ratings in countries with better democratic
institutions. To test this hypothesis, I use the Freedom House measures of political rights and
civil liberties as proxies of democracy. I use Logit to determine the veracity of each of these
two variables. I created this data set utilizing 47 countries from the Indo-Asia-Pacific,
expanding beyond the ten ASEAN countries to ensure the data set was large enough to
provide statistical significance. I use TIP Tier ratings for the dependent variable (DV),
creating a dummy variable by aggregating Tier 1 and Tier 2, against the second category of
Tier 2 Watch List and Tier 3. I created a dummy variable due to the nonlinearity of the fourcategory TIP Tier system. I use Freedom House's 2013 Political Rights and Civil Liberties
scores for the independent variable (IV), to measure democracy in each state.
Scholars disagree on how best to measure or define democracy, and these measures
are contentious and difficult to quantify. Nevertheless, scholars and political leaders,
including political and social scientists, economists, and historians, for decades have linked
democracy with human rights (Lipset 1959; Hirschman 1978; Vanhanen 2003; Ferguson
2011; Marshall and Gurr 2013 ). Further defining democracy, or the best measures of
democracy, is beyond the scope of this study.
As Table 4. 7 demonstrates, this model indicates that having a democratic government
is a reliable predictor of TIP Tier rating 81 % of the time. The model is statistically
significant.
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Table 4.7. Political Rights Strongly Predict TIP Tier Rating.

Varia
. bl es m
. th e E,qua f ion
B

Pol.Rights.2013

S.E.

Wald

Sig.

Exp(B)

.773

.221

12.213

.000

2.167

-4.167

1.174

12.608

.000

.015

Step 18
Constant
a.

Variable(s) entered on step 1: Pol.Rights.2013.

Dependent Variable (DV): 2013 TIP Tier Rating of 47 countries. DV converted into a dummy
(bivariate) variable, aggregating Tier 1 & 2 against Tier 2WL and Tier 3.
Independent Variable (IV): 2013 Political Rights and Civil Liberty scores, from Freedom House,
retrieved from http://www.freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-world
Nagelkerke R2 : .50
Model X2 = 20.75, Sig= .00
Percent correct= 80.9%

Hypothesis 4 (H4): States with increased growth in defense spending, as a percentage of
GDP, will have lower Trafficking in Persons (TIP) Tier ratings.
To test this hypothesis I analyze defense spending as a percentage of GDP for
Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines, from 2001through2012. I use the Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute's (SIPRI) 2013 "SIPRI Military Expenditure
Database." SIPRI provides data on 171 countries, but notes the difficulty of consistently
accurate information for comparison between countries. For example, the database note on
Indonesia clarifies that some defense funding is not reflected, due to extensive Army
participation in the economy through control of various foundations, enterprises, and
cooperatives. Because I primarily analyze three states to test this hypothesis, I have not
conducted extensive comparison. Therefore, analysis of results from this study should not be
extrapolated broadly without further study of available data, although SIPRI does provide
additional analysis globally and regionally.
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The countries displayed in Figures 4.2 and 4.3 are the same as the countries
represented in Table 4.2, which presents test one of hypothesis one, separating the ten
ASEAN member states between the most democratic versus the five least democratic states. I
conducted this limited analysis of defense spending to observe whether corruption,
democracy, and defense spending measures trended together.
Figure 4.1. Defense Spending as a Percentage of GDP for Indonesia, Thailand, and Philippines
2001-2012
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Source: Author derived data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the
2013 "SIPRI Military Expenditure Database."
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Figure 4.2. Defense Spending as a Percentage of GDP for Indonesia, Thailand, Philippines,
Mala sia, and Sin a ore, 2001-2012
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Source: Data derived by author from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI),
the 2013 "SIPRI Military Expenditure Database."

Figure 4.3. Defense Spending as a Percentage of GDP for Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar,
and Vietnam, 2001-2012

ASEAN: Govt Type (not free-dummy)
...,_Brunei
--- Cambodia
..... Laos
~ Myanmar

~ Vietnam

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Source: Data derived by author from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI),
the 2013 "SIPRI Military Expenditure Database."

Discussion and Findings
I argue that several key factors are highly critical in countering human trafficking,
and hence combatting the violation of human rights and human security.

Hypothesis 1 (Hl): States with lower levels of corruption will have improving
Trafficking in Persons (TIP) Tier ratings over time.
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The dependent variable, the TIP tier ratings of the three states under study, range
between Tier 2 and Tier 2 Watch List (WL); Singapore is the only ASEAN country during
this 13 year period to attain a Tier 1 rating, and only in 2006. The key takeaway from figure
4.4 is the general trending upwards for Indonesia and the Philippines, demonstrating
improvement in their policy approach to combatting human trafficking, by sustaining tier two
for seven and three years respectively. Conversely, Thailand's rating has dropped in recent
years, having not achieved a tier two rating since 2009. This drop indicates that the
government of Thailand was losing ground against human trafficking in the years since 2009,
relative to previous years. Incidentally, Thailand also experienced a marked increase in
defense spending, beginning in 2006 and peaking in 2009, as demonstrated in figure 4.1 ,
earlier in this chapter.
Fi ure 4.4. TIP Tier Ratio s: Indonesia, Thailand, and Phili
2001
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2006
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2008

ines 2001-2013
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Thailand

__._ Philippine:

5

Source: U.S. Department of State Trafficking in Persons Reports, 2001-201 3.
- On the vertical axis, 3 represents Tier 2 WL, while 4 represents Tier 3, the worst rating possible. On
the graph, an ascending line is good, descending is bad.
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Figure 4.5. Corruption Perceptions Index, Southeast Asia, 2001-2013 (alternating years)
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Figure 4.6. Corruption Perceptions Index, Indonesia, Thailand, and Philippines
2001-2013 (alternating years)
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Hypothesis one, which states that lower levels of corruption will lead to improving
TIP Tier ratings over time, appears to be at least partially correct. Establishing effective laws
and institutions to confront trafficking does appear to follow the trend of corruption, as
measured by Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions lndex. 9 See Figure 4.5 for

9

Data available from http://www.transparency.org/cpi2012/results
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CPI trend data for Southeast Asian countries from 2001-2013, the period of analysis for this
hypothesis. Figure 4.6 provides graphic representation of CPI trend data specifically of the
three primary states this chapter studying.
Given that Indonesia entered the TIP tier ratings at tier three, I would expect their
corruption ratings to be lower than those of Thailand and the Philippines, as well. Figure 4.4
indicates that public perceptions of corruption may be more difficult to assess than
anticipated, in correlation with human trafficking counter-measures. Thailand's CPI score
lags the TIP tier decline by several years; while Thailand dropped to the Tier Two Watch List
in 2009, their CPI did not register a decline until 2012. This finding may indicate an opposite
effect than anticipated; corruption perceptions appear to respond to TIP Tier ratings, not
precede them. Regardless, the variables do appear to be correlated.
One explanation for this lag is the type of data used for each measure, the CPI and
TIP Tier ratings. CPI is based on perceptions across the public, corporate, and private sectors,
where we can reasonably expect perceptions to shift slowly, as people and businesses that
bear the costs of corruption demand evidence of reform before adjusting their expressed
views. Conversely, TIP Tier ratings are calculated by a smaller group of diplomats and
government officials, who generally have greater access to information, have diplomatic
tools of coercion and incentivization at their disposal, and who view their final assessment as
qualitative analysis as well as a political tool to influence policy in the targeted state. Hence,
TIP Tier ratings are likely to be more responsive to incremental improvements than broader
public opinion. Finally, the TIP Tier ratings are based on criteria mandated by public law,
while public perceptions are influenced by broader and less standardized criteria.
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In retrospect, this finding is logical, as corruption perceptions are multifaceted, and
are unlikely to respond immediately or with significantly measureable effect unless in
response to a major event. Nevertheless, the correlation is evident. This hypothesis bears out
when analyzing broader institutionalization of human rights and human trafficking regimes,
supporting the research of Bales (2006), which identified a strong and statistically significant
correlation between human trafficking and corruption. An important distinction must be
acknowledged; corruption disproportionately threatens those who are least equipped to
defend themselves from exploitation, such as the poor and low-wage workers. Conversely,
corruption benefits those most able and willing to profit from it. This distinction illustrates
the importance of measuring government corruption as a predictive factor in human
trafficking, as well as a risk factor for national security threats.
The Indonesian government estimates that it has at least five or six million citizens
who work overseas; there are currently as many as eight million Philippino foreign workers,
nearly 10 percent of their population (Meissner 2013; Department of State 2013). 10 The
majority of these workers are poor, traveling to foreign lands in search of work to support
their families. In recent years both countries have made significant efforts to protect their
citizens who work abroad. Indonesia briefly declared a moratorium on migrant laborers
going to Saudi Arabia due to frequent reports of brutality and slave-like conditions, and the
summary execution of an Indonesian domestic laborer (al-Alawi 2011). The Government of
the Philippines has been an international leader recently in developing policies and
diplomatic mechanisms to protect their migrant workers, which is no small task for a poor
nation with estimates of nearly 10 percent of their population working abroad.

Also see "World Report 2012: Indonesia," published by Human Rights Watch, retrieved from
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related material/indonesia 2012.pdf
10
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Thailand, on the other hand, has been distracted by bouts of civil unrest since the
2006 military coup that ousted then-Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra (Department of State
2007). Thailand has experienced a series of political, social, and economic crises in recent
years that have hindered its ability to govern efficiently as well as hindering public
perceptions of the government. This level of political instability has drawn a great deal of
resources and attention away from the work of effective governance, towards internal
stability and security.
Hypothesis 2 (H2): States with more robust human rights regimes will have higher
Trafficking in Persons (TIP) Tier ratings. (higher TIP Tier ratings are good)

Such a simple test provides some initial indication, but requires further analysis. The
hypothesis was marginally supported by test one, as the five states listed as democratic
ratified 50% of the UN human rights conventions, while the non-democratic states ratified
46%. As the previous research suggested, the Philippines ratified the most, at 82%, or 27 of
the 33 conventions. Unexpectedly, the close second was Cambodia, a decidedly
undemocratic, violent, and highly corrupt country, especially when measured in terms of
corruption or political freedom.
A second state accounted for much of the additional convergence; Singapore ratified
only 27%, the lowest rate in ASEAN member states. Singapore has certainly demonstrated at
best a guided democracy history, especially in the tumultuous early decades of the 1950s1970s (Lee 2000). Yet, the other measures I have used in this study find Singapore routinely
at the top, not just regionally, but globally. Singapore rates in the top 5-10% of many
international indices in recent years, from corruption perceptions to ease of doing business,
and their success at lifting the nation out of poverty has been nothing short of amazing,
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especially in the context of the rough neighborhood in which the tiny nation-state grew up
(Allison and Blackwill 2013; Caplan 2013).
Ratification of liberal legislation does not a liberal government make, as Cambodia
demonstrates. National and international human rights regimes are impacted by a multiplicity
of factors, complicating predictions of human rights outcomes, whether a state ratifies human
rights legislation or not. Nevertheless, we can dissect elements of this complexity through
quantitative and qualitative analysis.
Test two provided the strongest support for the hypothesis, eliciting a positive
correlation and an 18 percent difference between the democratic and non-democratic states.
Comparing results from tests one and two reveals several important findings. First, the
impact of outliers can heavily influence quantitative analysis. Such data is of limited value,
except in context of a more comprehensive examination. The second finding is compelling
qualitative evidence in support of the hypothesis. Indonesia is a young democracy (see
chapter three) that faces significant economic, geographic, and political challenges, and yet
ranked third of all ten ASEAN member states, on this measure. Likewise, Indonesia has
maintained a TIP Tier two rating, even as Thailand and Malaysia both dropped to Tier three
in 2014 (U.S. Department of State 2014). This is more remarkable when viewed in context of
the resistance to international human rights institutions.
As evidence of this policy preference towards sovereignty, see Indonesia's caveat to
the 2000 Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women
and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational
Organized Crime.
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" ... the Government of the Republic on Indonesia declares that the provisions of Article [1]5
paragraph (2) Sub-paragraph c of the Protocol will have to be implemented in strict
compliance with the principle of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of a state; ... " Article
15 paragraph (2) provides for dispute arbitration through the International Court of Justice
when parties fail to resolve a dispute. Malaysia completely exempted themselves from
Article 15 (2), when ratifying this protocol in 2009, and Thailand declared, "[I]n accordance
with paragraph 3 of Article 15 of the Protocol, the Kingdom of Thailand does not consider
itself bound by paragraph 2 of the same Article (United Nations 2000)."
Test three, which compared Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam, or the CLMV
states, to the non-CLMV states of ASEAN, in an effort to observe the impact of development
on ratification rates. This test divided ASEAN states similar to test one, but shifted Brunei to
the first group, which in test one was labeled more democratic. The non-CLMV states are
comparatively more developed than CLMV, and Brunei is the wealthiest state amongst
ASEAN, except for Singapore.
Brunei is a unique case. By far the smallest state in ASEAN, with a population ofless
than 500,000, and a land mass larger than Singapore alone, Negara Brunei Darussalam, or the
Nation of Brunei, Abode of Peace, is an absolute monarchy ruled by Islamic law. Brunei is a
well-developed and oil-wealthy state, with the second highest per capita GDP in Asia, yet
Bruneian law allows death by stoning for adultery. An in-depth study of Brunei is beyond the
scope of this study, but this brief overview helps illustrate the complexity of Southeast Asia,
in terms of human rights human trafficking, and human security.
Despite the modification of test three from test one, the test resulted in virtually no
difference in ratification rates. Test four, which eliminated the outlier states from test three,
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elicited a ten percent difference in ratification rates, demonstrating that the CLMV test was
no stronger than the original democratic versus non-democratic state tests. Test five, on the
other hand, provided a strong and surprising result. When dividing the ten ASEAN states
along per capita GDP lines, I found a strong negative correlation between wealth and
percentage of human rights conventions ratified.
Hypothesis 3 (H3): Countries that are more democratic will have better human rights
records and/or institutions.
Democracy promotion is a core element of United States foreign policy, as articulated
in the 2010 National Security Strategy (Obama 2010). The United States often articulates
democratic values as vital for improving national security as well as human rights. Hence, the
annual Trafficking in Persons reports prescriptively emphasize democratic institutions in
response to human trafficking threats. I anticipated finding higher TIP Tier ratings in
countries with better democratic institutions.
This hypothesis supports the broader theory that democracy is a determinant of
human rights; political scientists have posited this view for many decades. Lipset (1959, 9091) argued that democracies with high levels of legitimacy and effectiveness were more
stable than illiberal ones. Hirschman (1978, 105) notes that human rights and democratic
liberties are public goods that make a society more resilient and attractive to its citizens. Rose
and Shin (2001) find that states with effective rule oflaw, robust institutions, and a system of
checks and balances to restrain government are associated with more stable democracies.
Scholars disagree on how best to measure or define democracy, and these measures
are contentious and difficult to quantify. Nevertheless, scholars and political leaders,
including political and social scientists, economists, and historians for decades have linked
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democracy with human rights (Lipset 1959; Hirschman 1978; Vanhanen 2003; Ferguson
2011; Marshall and Gurr 2013). Further defining democracy, or the best measures of
democracy, is beyond the scope of this study.
As Table 4. 7 demonstrates, this model indicates that having a democratic government
is a reliable predictor of TIP Tier rating 81 % of the time. The model is statistically
significant.
Hypothesis three provides the strongest support for this thesis. This hypothesis tests
one measure of democracy; future research will benefit from broadening this test
longitudinally, and by expanding the data set to include additional regions and sub-regions.
For example, comparing ASEAN states to NATO states, as well as to South Asian and
Eastern European states, would further test this method of measuring democracy, as well as
providing broader global comparison data. Additionally, future research could apply different
measures of democracy to the same DV, such as religious freedom, defense spending (as a
percentage of GDP), economic measures, ethnic diversity. Future research might include
variables based on extant models, such as Democratic Peace Theory or Singer's Correlates of

War.

Hypothesis 4 (H4): States with increased growth in defense spending, as a percentage of
GDP, will have lower Trafficking in Persons (TIP) Tier ratings.
I conducted this limited analysis of defense spending as a corollary to hypothesis one,
to observe whether the corruption, democracy, and defense spending measures trended
together. As Table 4.4 indicates, Thailand's defense spending increased rapidly, and
remained higher than both Indonesia and the Philippines, during the period of analysis.
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Thailand increased its defense spending significantly between 2006-2009, which began the
same year Thailand experienced its

12th

military coup since 1932.

Myanmar stands out as a second anomaly in Figure 4.3, as illustrated in their defense
spending spike beginning in 2010. Turnell (2008, 959) finds evidence over a period of
decades in Myanmar that military spending has consumed much of the country's resource
wealth, leaving little for effective governance. Turnell finds a negative correlation between
military rule and providing opportunities or security for its people. While spending more than
twice the amount on military than on health care and education combined, Turnell notes that
the last year Myanmar had a budget surplus was 1962, the same year the military junta took
control, ending any nascent democratic institution development (p 964).
Hypotheses one, two, and four find Myanmar at the lower end of the measures for
corruption, ratification of international human rights conventions, and maintaining defense
spending increases based on GDP. These are illustrated in Figure 4.5, where Myanmar trails
all other ASEAN states in the Corruption Perceptions Indexes, from 2001-2013; in Table 4.2,
finding Myanmar tied with Brunei for the lowest level of ratification of international human
rights conventions (with the exception of the outlier Singapore, which is explained earlier in
this chapter); and finally in Figure 4.3, which illustrates a jump in defense spending that
outpaces nearly all other ASEAN states. Tom Malinowski, the Washington Director of
Human Rights Watch, provided testimony to the U.S. Congressional Tom Lantos Human
Rights Commission, noting that the newly developing democratic government institutions
have no power over the military, contrasting the helplessness of the president to the
continued brutal repression of multiple minority groups throughout the country (U.S.
Congress. 2013. Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission; 109).
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Conclusion

In this study I have conducted comparative analysis of three ASEAN state responses
to the annual U.S. Department of State Trafficking in Persons reports. Specifically, I
examined Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand, their progress, failures, and challenges in
confronting human trafficking. I utilized selected quantitative data to observe these three
states within their ASEAN context, as well as contrasted against a broader set of 4 7
countries.
This research supports the hypothesis that states with improving TIP Tier ratings will
over time have lower levels of corruption. This conclusion is logical, using human rights as a
proxy for a state's interest in representing its people, which requires codifying rule of law,
but specifically developing such rules-based measures for the good of the society, not simply
the survival or profit of the ruling elites.
Hypothesis two examined several variables for their correlation with ratification of
international human rights and humanitarian law conventions and instruments, and found that
democratic states are more likely to ratify. Additionally, hypothesis two found that low per
capita GDP is correlated with higher ratification rates. Tests two and five provided the
strongest correlation, indicating with little surprise that we can expect states that are more
democratic to ratify international human rights conventions more frequently, but more
surprising is the indication that outliers might be predicted better by their per capita wealth or
poverty. This finding may indicate that poor states view international human rights regimes
as greater upside opportunity, with limited downside risk, similar to the model of antifragility
(Taleb 2012). Such upside and downside calculations may indicate that poor states view
international instruments as useful mechanisms to gain legitimacy, while their relative lack of
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resources provides some marginal explanation when they are held to account to those same
commitments.
Future research of this hypothesis might take a longitudinal analysis, complemented
by more in-depth case studies, focusing on outlier states that vary significantly from
predicted outcomes. Likewise, the third hypothesis proved statistically significant and robust.
Democracy can be predicted based upon the human rights record of a state. I have analyzed
these cases to gain a better understanding of Southeast Asian states and their role in regional
and global human trafficking, in the context of trafficking presenting a threat both to human
security and national security. In both cases, trafficking is destabilizing and undermines
democracy and sovereignty; an argument that every ASEAN government should find
compelling.
Appendixes
Appendix 4.1 Def"mitions of Trafficking in Persons (TIP) Tier ratings
Tier 1- Countries whose governments fully comply with the TVPA's minimum standards for

the elimination of trafficking.
Tier 2- Countries whose governments do not fully comply with the TVPA's minimum

standards but are making significant efforts to bring themselves into compliance with those
standards.
Tier 2WL- Countries where governments do not fully comply with the TVPA's minimum

standards, but are making significant efforts to bring themselves into compliance with those
standards, and:
1. the absolute number of victims of severe forms of trafficking is very significant or
is significantly increasing;
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2. there is a failure to provide evidence of increasing efforts to combat severe forms
of trafficking in persons from the previous year, including increased
investigations, prosecution, and convictions of trafficking crimes, increased
assistance to victims, and decreasing evidence of complicity in severe forms of
trafficking by government officials; or
3. the determination that a country is making significant efforts to bring itself into
compliance with minimum standards was based on commitments by the country
to take additional steps over the next year.
Tier 3- Countries whose governments do not fully comply with the TVPA's minimum

standards and are not making significant efforts to do so.
Due to changes in the William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection
Reauthorization Act of 2008, Section 107 (Hereafter TVPRA 2008), a country that remains
on Tier 2 Watch List for a third consecutive year must automatically be downgraded to Tier
3. The president may waive the automatic downgrade for up to two additional years, but after
four years on the Tier 2 Watch List, a country must be auto-downgraded to Tier 3, unless
upgraded to Tier 2.
Source: Department of State (DoS) Trafficking in Persons (TIP) Report (2013, 44)
Appendix 4.2 List of core International and United Nations Human Rights and Humanitarian
Law Conventions and Instruments

**
*
**
**
*
*

UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress & Punish Trafficking in Persons
ILO Convention 182, Elimination of Worst Forms of Child Labor
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child
Prostitution and Child Pornography
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child in Armed Conflict
ILO Convention 29, Forced Labour
ILO Convention 105, Abolition of Forced Labour
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
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Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),
aiming at the abolition of the death penalty
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR)
Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women (CEDAW)

**
**

Convention Against Torture, and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Convention on the Rights of the Child
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in
armed conflict
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child
Prostitution and Child Pornography
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of
Their Families
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance
1949 Geneva Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field
1949 Geneva Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea
1949 Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War
1949 Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War
1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I)
1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II)
2005 Protocol additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the
Adoption of an Additional Distinctive Emblem (Protocol III)
United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime

**

Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children
Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air
1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol
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1954 Convention relating to the status of Stateless Persons
1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness
UNESCO Convention against Discrimination in Education
*TIP 2013, p 405, Relevant International Conventions
**listed in both the 2013 TIP Report, and Mohan (2011)
Source: List compiled by author, based on three sources: Mohamad (2002), Mohan (2011), and the 2013 TIP
Report (2013, 405).

Chapter 5. Conclusion
President Obama's 2015 National Security Strategy affirmed that democracy and
human rights are essential foundations to long-term security and prosperity. Obama infused
the importance of leadership throughout this latest national security strategy, which
underlines the importance of policy in effectively shaping and enabling a global ecology of
democratic regimes.
"Underpinning it all, we are upholding our enduring commitment to the advancement of
democracy and human rights and building new coalitions to combat corruption and to
support open governments and open societies."
- President Barack Obama, in his February 2015 National Security Strategy
Several scholars and national security experts have recently linked human trafficking
and national security (Shelley 201 O; Rizer and Glaser 2011; Clapper 2012; Rosental 2013 ).
Nevertheless, a review of literature confirmed that trafficking continues to be viewed
primarily as a human rights issue, or more narrowly as a border security issue, but rarely as
both (Bales and Soodalter 2009; DeStefano 2008; Rizer and Glaser 2011; Ban Ki-moon
2012). This dichotomy raises the question of whether current policies effectively address
both the national security and human rights concerns of human trafficking. Therefore, in this
study I sought to assess the effectiveness of various policy approaches to human trafficking.
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In seeking to better understand policy responses to human trafficking, I conducted a
mixed methods analysis of available data to examine three levels of government response to
trafficking; domestic, regional/international, and foreign domestic measures. Specifically,
this study examined how the United States Senate develops anti-trafficking legislation, how
human rights regimes are developing within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN), and how specific Southeast Asian nations have responded to the annual
Department of State Trafficking in Persons report. In doing so, this thesis provides a multitiered analysis of human trafficking and an array of governmental entity responses to this
growing security challenge.
The second chapter found a more nuanced correlation regarding United States
Senator's policy preferences towards national security and human rights, than did Avery and
Forsythe (1979). During the l 12th and l 13th Congresses, liberal senators did tend to
emphasize human rights aspects of trafficking legislation, focusing heavily on the
exploitation of women and children. Conversely, conservative senators often emphasized
border security and fiscal responsibility. These areas of emphasis confirm earlier findings of
Avery and Forsythe, but the case study ofS.1301, the Trafficking Victims Protection

Reauthorization Act of 2011, and S.4 7, the Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of
2013, found that conservatives were also actively involved in human trafficking legislation.
Several conservative members of Congress led their peers in sponsoring legislation that
targets human trafficking.
While this study found little evidence of members of Congress (MC) directly
associating human trafficking as a national security interest, the study does indicate that MC
are more nuanced in their understanding of human rights and national security, certainly
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compared to the findings of Avery and Forsythe. Likewise, Congress appears less divided on
the issue of human trafficking than recent analysis of Congressional polarization might
suggest (Matthews 2013; Dimock, Kiley, Keeter, and Doherty, 2014; McCarty 2014).
To better understand regional and international responses to human trafficking, I
examined the process that led to the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration. ASEAN
unanimously signed the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration in 2012, providing an excellent
case to study the development of human rights regimes in the region. I applied Young's
(1982) model ofregime dynamics to analyze what factors influence the development and
effectiveness of those regimes. This study fills a gap in the literature, as no research has yet
applied Young's model of regime dynamics to ASEAN, and little research has studied
ASEAN and its passage of the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration.
The study confirms that Southeast Asia does have a growing ecology of human rights
regimes, both in government and in civil society. While rhetoric continues to dominate the
institutions of ASEAN and its member states, civil society in Southeast Asia is growing more
robust and active on issues of human rights. Likewise, the study finds support for the
normative influence of public pressure, and the accompanying political rhetoric.
Contrary to my hypothesis, I found little evidence that Indonesia exerted hegemonic
influence over the drafting and passage of the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration (AHRD),
indicating that the state is becoming less authoritarian, and utilized more negotiating and
bargaining tools within regional institutions, at least within the scope of this study.
Finally, this chapter found strong evidence of China exerting external hegemonic
influence over the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration proceedings, but little evidence of the
United States doing the same. In the context of this period of analysis, the 2012 ASEAN
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Human Rights Declaration case study supports the hypothesis of chapter two, as the United
States demonstrated minimal influence over the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration, despite
the heavy emphasis on human rights and international institutions in United States foreign
policy. During the period of study, the United States instead directed greater attention to
security concerns in the region, as China exerted hegemonic power in the South China Sea
and displayed aggressive action throughout the region. This finding does not necessarily
contradict the hypothesis that the United States would also exert hegemonic power in seeking
to impose its will over development of the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration (Young
1982). On the contrary, it may lend support to the earlier indication that more hawkish policy
makers tend to neglect human rights when they believe there is a more pressing national
security issue at stake (Avery and Forsythe 1979, 307).
The fourth chapter utilizes comparative analysis to examine democracy and human
rights in Southeast Asia by evaluating how different states respond to the annual Trafficking
in Persons reports, and what factors influence TIP Tier ratings. In an effort to analyze how
different government entities are responding to the challenge of human trafficking, and what
aspects of governance and diplomacy demonstrate effectiveness, I sought to answer the
following questions: Does the Department of State Trafficking in Persons Report effect
change on other states? I analyzed selected data to test four hypotheses designed to assess:
factors of corruption perceptions, ratification rates of international human rights conventions,
measures of democracy, and defense spending. I utilized a variety of data, to include
longitudinal quantitative data, to serve as proxy measures of human rights and democratic
values broadly within Southeast Asian states.
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I find support for the hypothesis that corruption and TIP Tier ratings are correlated,
which corroborates previous research (Bales 2006). The study found that democratic states
are more likely to ratify international human rights laws and conventions than less
democratic states, which was anticipated. More surprising was the finding that outlier states,
specifically smaller states that do not conform to this hypothesis, might be better predicted by
their per capita wealth or poverty than by their type of government. This finding may indicate
that economically poor states view international human rights regimes as offering greater
upside opportunity within the international community, with limited downside risk, similar to
Taleb's model of antifragility (2012). Such upside and downside calculations may indicate
that poor states view international instruments as useful mechanisms to gain legitimacy,
while their relative lack of resources provides some marginal explanation when they are held
to account for failing to uphold those same commitments. Future research might apply this
hypothesis to an adaptation ofTaleb's model of antifragility.
Likewise, I found support for the hypothesis that states with more robust human
rights regimes will have higher TIP Tier ratings. More broadly, this chapter supports the
association of democracy, human rights, and national security.
I found strong quantitative support for the hypothesis that democracy can be predicted
based upon the human rights record of a state. This model indicates that having a democratic
government is a reliable predictor of TIP Tier rating 81 % of the time. The model is
statistically significant. The quantitative analysis proved statistically significant and robust.
Measuring democracy is difficult; scholars disagree on how best to measure or define
democracy, and these measures are contentious and difficult to quantify. Nevertheless,
scholars and political leaders, including political and social scientists, economists, and

104

historians, have for decades linked democracy with human rights (Lipset 1959; Hirschman
1978; Vanhauen 2003; Ferguson 2011; Marshall and Gurr 2013). This finding is important
because it supports the broader thesis that human trafficking is a national security threat, and
lends credibility to the emphasis the United States places on diplomatic support for
democratic institutions throughout the world. Further research will benefit from broadening
the data set to include other regions, and to gain a greater longitudinal analysis. Additional
measures of democracy applied to this model will further strengthen the analysis, as will
additional structured and focused case studies.
The field of study will benefit from further research on the correlation between
human rights, democratic institutions, and national security. Specifically, Avery and
Forsythe's 1979 study could be replicated, by quantitatively analyzing the 112th and 113th
Congresses and their roll call votes on their human trafficking and national security bills.
During this period, multiple border security and immigration bills were debated and voted
on, which may serve as proxies for national security, much like human trafficking bills would
serve as proxies for the broader policy field of human rights.
The findings of this study require further research, but provide insight into effective
policies and diplomatic engagement vis-a-vis human rights norms and institution building,
especially where human rights issues converge with national security concerns. Human
trafficking is destabilizing and undermines democracy and state sovereignty, which is an
issue that every government should find compelling. This confluence of human rights and
national security must be broadly acknowledged and understood if we expect elected leaders
to shape policy that will effectively address both concerns.
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